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Executive Summary
In Korea, since 1994, policy decisions have been taken to introduce private capital in infrastructure
with a concession scheme to alleviate its budgetary restriction of the government and allow more
public resources to be devoted to other social spending as well as to achieve creativity and
efficiency from private sector. Since then, actual private fund investment has increased to occupy
9.6 % of total infrastructure investment in 2002. On one hand, such quantitative expansion of
private fund investment has been appraised in terms of attenuating budgetary limitation, and on the
other hand, qualitative results of have been on debate due mainly to optimistic demand forecasts in
hindsight and generous revenue guarantee as a reason.
In this regard, the government should understand strategic optimism of public sector about demand
forecasts. Under competitive process of public fund allocation selecting some projects among a lot
of projects proposed, the use of strategic optimism as tactics in power struggles for getting a project
started seems to best explain why demand forecasting are systematically overestimated. And when
the forecast is poorly estimated, it can lead to a considerable misuse of resources otherwise can
support other feasible projects.
One of solution to deal with strategic misuse of demand forecasting is involvement of private
participation at the risk of private investment. Indeed, actual regulatory regimes for demand risk
allocation and incentives vary significantly from one country to another. Among them, shadow toll
mechanism in the UK transfers demand risks to private participants and give higher incentive to
them. The concession company make its own demand forecast endogenously at the risk of its
investment. The minimum guarantee mechanism in Korea makes traffic risks be retained by the
government and gives lower incentive to private participants. In Korea, the preliminary feasibility
studies and detailed feasibility studies are done by exogenous entities such as public institutes rather
than by a concessionaire.
The argument is not to imply that the shadow toll mechanism is superior to minimum revenue
guarantee mechanism. Both systems have their own advantages and disadvantages and selection
and implementation of the regulatory regime could be based on unique situation of a country.
Nevertheless, in Korea, the success of the project depends primarily on accuracy of demand
forecasts from the public institutes and government's guarantee of up to 90% of expected revenue
significantly reduces incentive of private firms to screen the demand forecasts due to certain
confidence of future revenue to the degree of government guarantee allowed.
Then, theoretically, the current minimum guarantee mechanism in Korea can be improved in two
ways. The first is to reshape the total revenue curve similar to that of shadow toll mechanism. This
leads to increase incentive for a concessionaire to screen the project feasibility at the risk of its
investment, and also decrease the budgetary burden for the revenue guarantee. The second is to
improve the accuracy of demand forecasts done by public institutes, making competitive
environment with introducing other private institute and private firms in the market. This option is
exogenous method and is not as powerful and reachable as endogenous way such as the first option
Chapter 1. Introduction
1-1. The objective of the thesis
Korea has experienced rapid economic growth rate for more than decades. And, with the economic
expansion, demand for basic infrastructure services has outstripped the supply capacity of exiting
assets, which results in infrastructure deficits. If not eliminated, these deficits could create serious
obstacle to further economic growth as well as economic and social inequality leaving certain
segments of the population isolated from the benefits of the economic development. Therefore,
since 1994, policy decisions have been taken to introduce private capital in infrastructure with a
concession scheme to alleviate its budgetary restriction of the government and allow more public
resources to be devoted to other social spending.
With this regard, the government made several long-term investment plan in infrastructure during
2000-2020 to catch up with the increasing demand in the sector, and, based on them, made a
updated mid-long term private fund investment plan during 2002-2011. Since 1995, the total 128
projects have been announced as PPI projects. Among them, 83 projects (65%) have found private
participants and 27 projects (21%) are under operation, then the actual private fund investment has
increased to occupy 9.6 % of total infrastructure investment in 2002. And the government also
made the list of future PPI projects as a reference to manage the future PPI projects, which consist
of 179 projects with total cost estimate of 63 trillion Won.
On one hand, such quantitative expansion of private fund investment has been appraised in terms of
attenuating budgetary limitation and following allowance of investment in other social sectors, and
on the other hand, qualitative results of PPI projects have been on debate mainly from too generous
revenue guarantee to concession companies. If not properly managed, these problems will be likely
lead to unexpected budgetary expenditure and burden on taxpayers in the future, even though it is
just in the beginning stage of performance of some PPI projects implemented, and one cannot rule
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out possibility of improvement under the revenue guarantee regime unchanged.
So, this thesis is to review lessons from worldwide experiences of privatization process for
government's roles to regulate private participation in transportation infrastructures and services, to
analyze current situation in Korea in context of privatization focusing on managing demand
forecasts risks to deal with possible optimistic behaviors in the public and private sector under the
generous government income guarantee mechanism through comparison with the case in UK, and
to suggest strategic implication for the government to achieve service quality improvement from
efficiency and creativity as well as expansion of transportation infrastructure and services from
private participation.
1-2. The structure of the thesis
Chapter 1 (Introduction) provides the objective and structure of the thesis.
In chapter 2 (the government's roles in private participation in infrastructure), fruitful lessons from
worldwide experiences about privatization are reviewed in empirical and theoretical way focused
on the roles of the government to regulate private participation in infrastructure. In details, based on
various studies on such issues, setting the objective of privatization, creating competition to manage
monopoly issue, identifying and allocating various risks and providing correspondent incentives,
arranging regulatory regime to manage price and quality of services, and organizing concession
contract are reviewed.
Chap3 (Private Participation in Infrastructure in Korea) describes current situation in Korea in
context of privatization. First, the objective of introducing and facilitating private participation in
infrastructure is discussed with perspective of catching up with increasing infrastructure demand
and alleviating budgetary burden through private fund investment, and allocating the savings to
other sectors. Second, the legal frame is introduced. Finally, implementation status of 128 projects
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announced as PPI projects so far is introduced in details and also long term infrastructure
investment plan through private participation is discussed with potential PPI project list.
Some undesirable drawbacks appeared in the implementation of the projects, as well as successful
expansion of private fund investment in the field, are discussed. Among them, generous government
revenue guarantee is considered as one of the ultimate problems to be solved to manage optimistic
demand forecasts as shown in some large toll concession roads under operation.
Chapter 4 (Demand forecasting and risk allocation in transportation infrastructures) focuses on
issues on demand forecasts. It shows that overestimated demand forecasts and cost overruns in large
infrastructure projects are common, the unbiased failure implies possible strategic optimism from
public and private sector due mainly to competitive environment to get a given project selected and
started, and involving private participation at the risk of recovery of the private investment could be
a solution to deal with the strategic optimism. It also argue that revenue guarantee could reduce
incentives to screen feasibility of a concession project through comparison with shadow toll
mechanism in the U.K.
Chapter 5 (Conclusion) summarizes the discussions and suggests several strategic implications for
the new government's role to regulate private participation in transport infrastructures and services
in Korea.
Chapter 2. The government's roles in private participation in infrastructure
2-1. The Rise of Private Participation
In recent years, the private participation in the transportation infrastructures and services have
increased, because the public sector have had difficulty catching up with increasing demand of the
infrastructures and providing enough efficiency and creativity to the sector to keep price and quality
in certain level. So, private participation has been regarded as an alternative to solve the problems,
which have been incurred by the public management. (Estache & Strong, 2000)
There are many forms of private participation in transport, including :
The contracting out of services, where the private sector is contracted to provide services on behalf
of the government for compensation, either in terms of a share of revenue, profit, or payments from
the government. In general, contracting out does not involve financing risk, although it may involve
revenue risk.
Joint ventures, in which the public and private sectors share responsibility for financing and
operation of public facilities;
Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) projects, where the private sector has the primary responsibility for
financing, developing, and operating the facility for a fixed period of time, which should be
sufficient to both repay debt and provide the required return on investment. At the end of the
concession, assets are transferred to the government under terms agreed to in the contract. Perhaps
the most familiar form of participation in transport infrastructure, this has been employed in many
different variations.2
1 Estache & Strong, 2000, pp2 -3
2 These include Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), Design-Build-Finance-Operate
(DBFO), and Design-Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF).
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Build, Own, and Operate (BOO), where the private sector obtains the ownership and control of the
facilities, with no transfer to the public sector.
Within these broad categories is a continuum of organizational forms for private participation in
which the risk level taken on by the private sector increases until it gets fully assumed. Project
finance and regulatory issues arise generally from the organizational forms organized around
concessions, franchises, and variations of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects with or without
concessions. (Estache and Strong, 2000, p3)
< Forms of Private investment projects in Korea >
Based on the Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure in Korea, private investment projects can
be conducted in one of the following methods:
* BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate): Ownership of the infrastructure facilities is transferred to the State
or local government upon completion of construction, and the concessionaire has the right to
operate the infrastructure facilities for a specified period of time;
* BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer): The concessionaire assumes ownership of the infrastructure
facilities for a specified period of time after completion of construction, and the ownership is
transferred to the State or local government upon the termination of the concession period;
* BOO (Build-Own-Operate): The concessionaire owns and operates the infrastructure facilities
upon completion of construction;
* BLT (Build-Lease-Transfer): Upon completion of construction of the infrastructure facilities, the
concessionaire leases the facilities to the government for a period of time and upon termination of
the lease the ownership then is transferred to the State or local government;
* ROT (Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer): Upon rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure facilities
owned by the State or the local government, the concessionaire has the right to operate the facilities
for a specified period of time;
* ROO (Rehabilitate-Own-Operate): Upon rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure facilities, the
concessionaire owns and operates the facilities; and
* Other methods in the instruction for proposal for private participation in infrastructure as
proposed by the competent authority under Article 10 of the Act on Private Participation in
Infrastructure.
2-2. The government's roles in private participation in infrastructure
In many countries, transportation infrastructures and services have been managed by the public
sector with budgetary fund. But, the public management has resulted in inefficiency, lack of
creativity, extraordinary lifecycle costs. And this generally leads to undesirable price and quality
problems against users and tax burden to taxpayers. In addition, increasing demand of budget
toward other sector such as social welfares, make it more difficult to finance the transportation
infrastructure with budgetary funding. These problems have encouraged increasing private
involvement in the sector to achieve creativity and efficiency from private entities. Nevertheless,
this implies that the government needs to assume new responsibilities to regulate the privatization
process, rather than that the government is no longer needed. (Estache & de Rus, 2000)
2-2-1. The government's objectives of privatization
It is important that the government understands its objectives in pursuing privatization because
these objectives will direct all activities undertaken; most importantly perhaps the objectives should
affect the regulatory decisions.
The government's objectives of introducing private participation can have an important impact on
the pace of network expansion and quality improvements. For example, if a government places
priority on keeping tariff in certain level, it could need government support and lead to lack of fund
available, hence slow the expansion and improvement of the service. On the other hand, if the
government places a priority on expanding access, allowing enough recovery of investment to catch
up with real costs with user-pay principle, it could lead to further expansion of network with new
resources saved by the scheme (Gary, 2001).
In the context of privatization, Estache & de Rus emphasize that the government have multiple
objectives such as efficiency for minimizing costs, fairness for guaranteeing reasonable return on
private investment, reducing fiscal deficit, minimizing political conflict, control prices and service
quality from monopolists, creating competitive environment. When an objective dominates the
others, it can reduce the scope for another objective, so regulator should make the consequences of
these multiple objectives as transparent as possible (Estache & de Rus, 2000).
2-2-2 Regulation of monopoly and competition
Most infrastructure sectors were once considered to be "natural" monopolies, in the sense that a
single firm could supply a market at least cost. However, advances in technology and in economic
thinking have shown that competition is not only feasible but also desirable in a growing number of
industry segments including transport services. Competition is a powerful driver of efficiency,
create strong incentives for improving service and can help to reduce the regulatory burden. Even
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when competition in the market is not feasible, some of its benefits can be achieved by introducing
competition for the market. Under this approach, time-bound monopoly franchises are awarded by
competitive bidding and periodically re-bid. This helps to ensure countries get the best deal
available from private firms, including in terms of investment commitments, and provides
incentives for firms to perform well to retain the franchise. (Gary, 2001, pp6-7)
Competition in the market guarantees free entry and exit and lets demand and supply determine
prices and quality mixes. Although introducing quality standards is often useful, this can be done
without altering the nature of competition. This form of competition is effective in ensuring the
long-run sustainability of efficiency gains. Competition for the market is organized through an
auction used to force potential monopolists to compete with each other for the right to be the single
provider of a service. The challenge is to design the auction to ensure that it forces the bidders to
pass on many of the efficiency gains they should be able to achieve to the users, and to achieve
results similar to those that would be achieved through competition in the market. (Estache & de
Rus, 2000, p12)
Estache and de Rus (2000) also provide the Figure 1 that shows the logic to follow to assess what
type of competition is desirable and to map the type of competition. Indeed, if competition in the
market cannot work, competition for the market can be quite effective to obtain efficiency from a
monopoly. In the Figure 1, activities could be divided into infrastructure and superstructure
vertically (for instance, road is infrastructure, gas station is a superstructure). It starts with a rather
simple question: is it cheaper to produce with a single firm than with more firms? In practice, the
short-run concerns tend to dominate the longer-run needs of future generations. If two or more
companies can do better than a single firm, interfering with competition in the market is not
necessary. Then, if short-run gains are not particularly impressive compared with long-run gains,
monopoly is not a viable option and competition should be prepared. A first way to push for
competition is to separate infrastructure and superstructure vertically. This provides an opportunity
to introduce competition in some specific activities. Horizontal separation also can help: for
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instance, this means separating passengers and freight in rail services. Competition still has a role to
play once the activities have been sufficiently separated and the remaining natural monopolies have
been identified. Competition for the market allows the regulator to get efficiency gains in the sector
under monopoly.
Figure 1. Natural monopoly and competition
Source: Estache & de Rus, 2000
2-2-3 Risk identification and allocation
One of the important principles of risk identification and allocation in private participation in
infrastructure is to make project participants that controls or is best able to manage the risks to bear
them, which is responsible for the government to regulate the privatization process.
Identifying the various types of risks, and their distribution across the various agents, is important
because it influences the incentives these various agents will have to behave in one way or another
on regulatory matters. For instance, if a concessionaire is allowed to pass through all increases in
costs because of changes in safety legislation, it will have little incentive to pick the most cost-
effective technologies, because it does not bear the costs of its choice. This is why the British
airport regulator only allowed a pass-through of 95 percent of these costs when a new safety norm
was introduced for airports in 1996 (Estache and de Rus, 2000, p26).
Kerf and others also argue that "full pass-through" should exist only if certain risks are out of
control of private participants, such as floods, national strikes, or earthquakes. Otherwise, the risks
should be allocated to the parties best able to control them, hence to minimize the costs of projects
given (Kerf et al, 1997).
The risk identification and allocation should be specified in the concession contract, and even in the
draft transmitted to the potential bidders, and the role is up to the government. Estache and de Rus
(2000) provide brief summary of standard recommendation and logics for risk assignments in
concession contracts as follows:
* During the design stage, if specification failures do arise in the bidding documents that the
governments provides, and they are clearly the responsibility of only the government. If the failure
is in the design proposal as part of the bids provided by the bidder, it is the bidder's fault.
* During the construction stage, legal changes or difficulties and delays in expropriations of land
can increase the costs of a project, but the contractor is generally not responsible. The government
or an insurance company should thus cover this risk. Construction difficulties caused by technical
failures in the choice of material or equipment are, of course, the constructor's responsibility.
* During the operational stage, cost risks should be the operator's responsibility unless cost
overruns are due to the government's failure to deliver on a specific commitment that results in cost
increases. Revenue risks should also be the operator's responsibility unless the contract specifies
otherwise, or when the failure to generate the expected revenue is the result of a government action
Indeed, the actual risk sharing practiced between concession companies and public authorities vary
significantly from one country to another as shown in the Table 1 that includes analysis of actual
risk sharing for road concession contracts in Europe. Diversity of actual risk identification and
allocation is also shown in the two examples attached in the Annex 1 and Annex 2.
Tablel: Analysis of risk sharing for road concession contracts in Europe
Force majeure Technical risk Commercial Financial Concession
risk* risk** company
remuneration
England # A A Shadow toll
Austria #A A A Toll
Belgium #A A A Toll
Spain #A A A Toll
Finland # A A Shadow toll
France # A A A Toll
Greece # A A A Toll
Italy # A A A Toll
Norway # # A A Toll
Netherlands # # * A Shadow toll
Portugal # A A A Toll
* tariffxtraffic risk in the case of tolled section or traffic risk in the case of shadow toll
** not taking account of any State guarantee
Legend: #: Risks borne by the government concession authority
*:Risks borne by the concession company, but substantially supported/limited
A: Risks borne by the concession company
Source: French Highway Directorate (1999)
2-2-4 Selection of regulatory regime for price and quality control3
Estache and de Rus (2000) argue that the regulator has two objectives: the first to ensure that the
operator gets a reasonable rate of return on investment and hence to ensure that investment actually
takes place, and the second to make sure that this return is not excessive and hence to ensure that
the operator with monopoly power does not abuse the power and to ensure that the users benefit
from better price and quality of the service. These objectives can be achieved in many ways. The
two extremes are rate of return regulation and price caps and the other options tend to be hybrid
solutions as explained as follows:
Rate of return regulation
Until recently, the main approach to monopoly regulation was the control of maximum rate of
return allowed from investment. It is essentially an indirect way of controlling prices, because
prices above the competitive prices will result in an above-normal rate of return of the sector. The
allowed rate of return determines the allowed profits of the firm, as illustrated by equation
(2.1) Allowed rate of return xassets value = prices xquantities - operational costs
This expression implies that a firm will not be interested in the business unless
(2.2) Prices xquantities Ž operational costs + allowed rate of return xassets value
The main problem with this indirect form of price regulation comes from perverse incentives built
into equation 2.1 and 2.2. The larger the value of the asset, the larger the benefits allowed, and
hence the higher the prices will be. This can result in an incentive to over-invest (the Averch-
Johnson effect), or simply to overstate the value of the assets when their correct value is difficult to
3 Except information about Korea, this chapter is directly quoted from Alexander et al, 1999 an Estache and de Rus, 2000, pp 30 -3 5
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assess precisely. In addition, the equation 2.2 shows that the operator does not have much incentive
to cut costs, because the larger the costs, the larger the benefits allowed.
In terms of quality of services, under rate of return regulation, over-investing in quality may be a
rewarding strategy for private investors. A limit to over-invest clearly exists. This limit is
determined by the interaction between price levels and quality on the one hand and willingness to
pay on the other. For instance, a toll road concessionaire may have an incentive to over-invest in
road quality, but only to the extent that the resulting toll level is consistent with the overall
willingness to pay for road services and with the risks implied by the existence of competition in
the form of alternative modes or routes.
These problems have led some regulators to adopt adjusted versions of the rate of return approach,
allowing the operator to share in the profits resulting from cost or price reduction, and generating a
significant increase in demand.
Rate of Return Regulation of Tariff in Korea
In Korea, the tariff was controlled by rate of return regulation. Under the Act on Inducement of
Private Fund in Infrastructure (1994), one of the main issues was that the formula about the tariff
calculation as follows:
(2-3) Present Value (PV) of construction cost (CC) + 10% of PV of Construction Cost (CR)* = PV
of operation revenue (OR) + PV of operation cost (OC) + PV of ancillary revenue (ANR)
With this formula, the tariff was controlled by rate of return. However, CR* unfamiliar in the
normal rate of return formula for tariff control was on debate because some argued that it double
profit the concessionaire through government's guarantee about profit in construction itself.
So, in the rate of return formula for tariff control, the profit of construction itself was removed in
the Act on PPI (1998) as follows.
(2-4) PV of construction cost (CC) = PV of operation revenue (OR) + PV of operation cost (OC) +
PV of ancillary revenue (ANR)
This can be described in detail as follows:
n CC 
_i ORi - OCi N ANR,
i=0 (1 +r)' i=n+l (1 + r) i=0 (1 + r)
n : time of completion of construction
N time of expiration of concession period or period of ownership and operation
CCi : annual input of the project cost required for the completion of construction of
facilities--Government financial support shall be excluded herefrom.
ORi : annual operation revenue (annual operation cash inflow)
OCi : annual operation cost (annual operation cash outflow)
ANRi : annual net revenue cash inflow from supplementary project(s); income - expenditure
r : real rate of return of the project
The proposer (a potential concessionaire) shall autonomously suggest the rate of return for
agreement on the basis of the expected rate of return considering factors such as investment cost,
operation revenue, finance procurement costs, etc. The proposer and the competent authority shall
agree upon the rate of return through negotiations.
The following items may be taken into account in determining the rate of return for agreement:
First, the average level of interest rate for borrowing from both domestic and international
financial organizations with respect to infrastructure facilities;
Second, the risk premium after taking into account the risks that can be expected from the
project characteristics and its implementation such as the type, scale, security of operation revenue,
revenue from supplementary facilities, the level of risk allocated to the Government, etc.;
Third, level of rate of return for similar private investment project cases in domestic and
international market. The detailed information about the formula above is in the Annex 4.
Price cap regulation
The UK introduced an alternative to rate of return regulation as part of the privatization of the
1970s and 1980s in various sectors, and it is now becoming common worldwide. It increases the
cost incentives and reduces the incentive to over-invest. It is based on the control of maximum
prices/the imposition of price caps. The price cap allows an operator to increase its prices with
inflation, less a "discount" reflecting all or part of the average increase in productivity (a factor X)
in the sector as shown in the equation 2-5. This factor is introduced to ensure that the gains from
technological improvements are not simply an increase in the monopoly's profit, but they also
benefit the users. In the case of industries with little capital, X can be negative, allowing increases
in real prices intended to stimulate new investments or to improve quality of service as imposed by
the sector.
(2.5) Price in year 1 •_price in year 0 x(inflation -factor X)
Defining price in year 0, if prices were controlled and dramatically subsidized before privatization,
the regulator cannot rely on current observed prices because they are probably too low. The
regulator must be careful not to be strict on the cap. If the firm cannot cover all costs, including the
risk premium and the real costs associated with bankruptcy, it will enter into renegotiations4, which
are always difficult and may lead to suspension of maintenance and investment. This can be
damaging to the network. When the initial conditions are too confusing, relying on best
international practice as a first step is often a good option.
Next, the regulator must pick X. When X is set to 0, prices are simply adjusted for inflation,
maintaining the real price as a constant. When efficiency gains are expected in the regulated
industry, a positive X will lower real prices. This should stimulate the firm to cut costs, and to
achieve efficiency gains higher than the industry average. A negative X will increase real prices and
the regulator should use it when it wants to promote additional investment in capacity or quality.
Once the regulator has fixed X, it is usually kept constant for four to six years and the regulator
does not adjust prices to reflect efficiency gains for the duration. After that period, the regulator
revises the X based on observed cost reductions and passes on all or part of these gains to the user
by resetting the value of X appropriately.
In terms of quality of services, under a standard price cap regime, a subtle cut in quality can be a
tempting way to cut costs because any reduction in quality can lead to cost saving and profits to the
concessionaire. So, adjustment of the formula based on quality of service has been adopted in the
U.K.
Regulatory regime practiced in selected countries
The actual regulatory regimes established vary from one country to another as well as from one
sector to another. Alexander and others provide the table shows an example of three categories of
regulatory regime identified as follows:5
4 With this regard, the two examples are on the same basis for ensuring reasonable rate of return
5 For more detailed information about quantitative risk analysis in financial terms, see Alexander et al, 1999
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* high-powered regimes-these are regimes where significant incentives for companies to reduce
costs are established through CPI-X type regimes (price-caps, revenue-caps etc.);
* medium-powered regimes-these regimes involve some incentivisation of companies, but normally
through hybrid schemes and less explicit regulatory regimes; and
* low-powered regimes-these are basically the standard rate-of-return type approaches to regulation
Table 2: Regulatory regime practiced in selected countries
Regulatory regime
High-powered
Medium-powered
Low-powered
Airports (UK, Australia), Buses (Singapore), Railways (UK), Roads
(Australia), and Others (UK)
Airports (Italy, Denmark, Austria), Buses (UK-London, Australia-Sydney),
Railways (Australia), and Roads (Italy)
Buses (Hong Kong), Railways (Argentina, USA, Japan), and Tunnels (Hong
Kong)
Source: Alexander et al, 1999
Under traditional rate of return regulation, governments have generally guaranteed to operators that
they would recover their costs and get a markup to remunerate investors. Since these regimes do not
give a strong incentive to operators to cut costs, they are called low-powered regime. Low powered
regimes are also low risk regimes since cost recovery is almost guaranteed.
Under price caps, the regulatory regime could be designed to minimize costs in maximum level.
Price caps require the operators to cut the costs and to hence keep the cost saving they were
bringing to the sector for a limited period.
In many countries, hybrid systems are approached, which result in some degree of immediate rent
sharing at the beginning of the period of private sector operations. These regimes are becoming
increasingly common. Table 2 shows actual regulatory regimes practiced in selected countries.
2-2-5. Financial support from government 6
There are two main reasons for government to commit to support for project financing (1) to offset
the financial or exchange risks by reducing capital expenditures or to improve revenues to the
extent necessary for a project to cover debt service and provide a reasonable equity returns; (2) to
offset the demand and traffic risk and protect investors (especially lenders) from the risk that actual
cash flows and thus be inadequate to cover debt service. When unexpected events arise and a
renegotiation of a contract arises, these two are often the main problems a regulator must address.
The name of the game is to come up with a mix of government actions that ensures that an
acceptable financial return can be generated. These actions may include some redesign of the
financing schemes to include guarantees but also of the project design, including its duration.
If public financial support is appropriate, a variety of mechanisms can be used to support private
financing. The instruments range from revenue enhancement to equity guarantees.
Equity guarantees. They provide a concessionaire an option to be bought out by the government
at a price that guarantees a minimum return on equity. Although the liability is contingent, the
government in effect assumes project risk and corresponding private sector incentive are reduced.
Debt guarantees. These guarantee that the government will pay any shortfall related to principal
and interest payments. The government may also guarantee any refinancing that is scheduled. It
creates significant government exposure and reduces private sector incentives, although it may
decrease the cost or increase the amount of debt available to the project.
Exchange rate guarantees. With an exchange rate guarantee, the government agrees to compensate
the concessionaire for increases in financing cost due to exchange rate effects on foreign financing.
Exchange rate guarantees expose the government to significant risk, as well as increasing the
incentive to utilize foreign capital.
Grants/subsidies. Equity and debt guarantees all create contingent liabilities for the government.
Alternatively, governments can furnish grants or subordinated loans at project inception, buying
down the size of the project that needs private finance. (In Chile, the size of the government grant
was one of the criteria used in awarding the South Access toll road concession.) Alternatively,
explicit subsidies can be given as part of the renegotiation process. In Argentina, this subsidy took
the form of a forgiveness of accumulated payments due to the government for the right to operate
the concession. In general, these grants or subsidies have no provision for repayment.
Subordinated loans. Subordinated loans can fill a gap in the financing structure between senior debt
and equity. From the government's perspective, they also have the attractive feature that they can be
repaid with a return if the road is successful. Subordinated loans improve feasibility by increasing
the debt service coverage on senior debt, and by reducing the need for private equity, which
requires a higher return. However, because subordinated debt does eventually require repayment, it
does not improve project feasibility to the same degree as a similarly sized grant. Another
alternative would be for the government to contribute financing that has characteristics of both debt
and equity. One such instrument would be a "reverse convertible" contribution that would remain as
equity unless the project was successful, at which point it would convert to debt for repayment.
An alternative for the regulator is to pay with the design of the contract. This involved playing with
the revenue from toll and with the toll levels and types, with the specification of the investment and
other service obligations or with the duration of the contract.
6 Except information of Korea, this chapter is directly quoted from Estache & Strong, 2000, pp2 1-23.
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Minimum traffic and revenue guarantees. A minimum traffic or revenue guarantee, in which the
government compensates the concessionaire if traffic or revenue falls below a minimum threshold,
is a relatively common form of support for toll roads. Typically, the threshold is set 10 to 30 percent
below the expected volume and it is generally more desirable to rely on a revenue guarantee if the
goal is to facilitate the access of the operator to the financial market. This trigger reduces
government exposure while providing sufficient revenue coverage to support the debt component of
the capital structure. In addition, traffic and revenue guarantees help retain financial incentives in
the project, unless conditions deteriorate well below forecast. If government's share "downside
risk" with the private sector through guarantees, they should also consider seeking instruments that
allow profit on the "upside". One way to do this is by a revenue-sharing arrangement in which the
government receives a portion of revenues above a maximum traffic threshold.
Shadow tolls. One way of providing subsidies is through shadow tolls. Under a shadow toll, the
government contributes a specific payment per vehicle to the concessionaire. In effect, it is an
ongoing revenue stream from the government in lieu of an up-front grant or loan. Because they are
paid over time, they may be less of a burden on the public budget. The drawback of shadow tolls,
though, is that they may not provide investors with much protection from revenue risks. That is,
shadow toll payments are highest when traffic volumes are large. As a result, government payments
may be inadequate to protect investors when traffic is low and may be unnecessarily high when
traffic volumes are high. In addition, the payment of shadow tolls over time creates a credit risk for
concessionaires. These inefficiencies can be reduced in a number of ways, such as a declining
payment schedule as volumes increase or maximum traffic level beyond which shadow tolls are not
paid. Because they tend to "top off' private revenues, shadow tolls may be particularly valuable as
support to low volumes roads that require upgrading or rehabilitation rather than new construction.
Concession extensions and revenue enhancements. These types of financial support involve limited
public sector risk, but also do little to support or enhance private financing. First, a government can
extend the concession term if revenues fall below a certain amount. Second, a government can
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restrict competition or allow the development of ancillary services by the concessionaire.
Changes in contractual obligations. A final way generally considered by regulators is to allow a
redesign of the contractual obligations. Slower or less investments, fewer services obligations, are
all ways of cutting costs and transforming a unviable road into a viable one.
In general, the most advantageous types of support for the concessionaire are those which provide
early funding streams (when revenues from the toll road are low or non existent during the
construction period) and which give guarantees for unexpected problems (for example, exchange
rate guarantees). This is true at the time the contract is initially signed but also whenever the
regulator is asked to renegotiate to restore financial viability to a project who may have lost it. The
least significant are these which themselves are unpredictable i.e., additional rights for development
around the road. These various mechanisms of government support can also be used in combination
when a project is nor feasible on its own and where revenue risk is substantial. In such cases, grant
plus minimum revenue guarantees may be sufficient to induce private participation. Governments
should avoid broad guarantees that reduce lenders' scrutiny and due diligence. In many cases, the
availability of these guarantees induced lenders to provide funds based on guarantees and sponsor
strength rather than underlying project risks and revenues.
Financial support from government in Korea
Based on the Act on PPI (Article 53) and its Enforcement Decree (Article 37), The State or local
government may grant a subsidy or long-term loan to the concessionaire within the scope of the
budget upon deliberation of the Committee in the following cases:
* When it is otherwise inevitable to avoid dissolution of the corporation;
* Where a subsidy or long-term government loan is inevitable to maintain the tariff at an
appropriate level;
* Where it is difficult to induce private capital due to a decrease in the profitability of the project
resulting from a considerable expenditure disbursed as compensation for land;
* Where the actual operation revenue (the amount obtained by multiplying the demand for the
concerned facility by tariff) falls considerably short of the estimated operation revenue under the
concession agreement, to such an extent that it would be difficult to operate; or
* Where it would be deemed difficult to conduct the private investment project smoothly without
a long-term loan or subsidy, while such individual project alone bears low profitability but can
increase efficiency such as a considerable reduction in the construction period, cost, etc., when
conducted together with other private investment projects as a whole.
"the Private Participation in Infrastructure Annual Plan" that should be announced annually based
on the Act on PPI describes the criteria and method for financial support in details as follows.
Financial support to maintain appropriate level of tariff
After the competent authority calculates the computed tariff (level of charges estimated under the
assumption that there is no financial support) and the proper tariff (level of charges estimated in
comparison with substitute facilities with convenience and competitiveness factors taken into
account) for each facility concerned such as road, railroad, harbor, etc., should the computed tariff
exceed the proper tariff, the competent authority may provide financial support within the scope
necessary to maintain the level of the proper tariff.
Subsidy or long-term loan may be granted to the concessionaire within the scope of the budget for
the purpose of land compensation or construction cost, etc. provided, however, that the timing of
32
the financial support be determined in the concession agreement in connection with the equity
investment plan of the concessionaire.
The guarantee of minimum operation revenue and the redemption of excess revenue
Should the actual operation revenue come short of the specified limit of the estimated operation
revenue determined in the concession agreement, the tariff may be adjusted or financial support
may be provided to compensate for the shortage. Provided, however, that the excess revenue may
be redeemed, should the actual operation revenue exceed a specified limit in connection with the
guarantee of minimum operation revenue.
The maximum limit on the guarantee of operation revenue may be imposed up to ninety percent
(90%) of the estimated operation revenue--eighty percent (80%) for the unsolicited projects. In
the case of minimum operation revenue guarantee, when the actual operation revenue exceeds one
hundred and ten percent (110%) of the estimated operation revenue-one hundred and twenty
percent (120%) for the unsolicited projects according to the guaranteed amount, the State or the
local government redeems the excess revenue.
Within the boundaries of the operation revenue guarantee, the competent authority may determine
separately the criteria and methods of operation revenue guarantee and government redemption of
excess revenue in accordance with the special characteristics and distinctions of each project.
Financial support against exchange rate risk
If, due to the extraordinary fluctuation of the exchange rate, a foreign exchange loss or gain occurs
to the foreign currency borrowed by the concessionaire for construction fund (excluding operation
fund), the tariff and such may be adjusted to reflect such change, or the State or local government
may provide financial support for the foreign exchange loss or redeem the foreign exchange gain.
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* Fluctuation range in exchange rate within ± 20%: Concessionaire shall bear the loss (foreign
exchange loss) or benefit from the gain as incentive (foreign exchange gain).
* Foreign exchange rate increase of more than 20% (foreign exchange loss): tariff adjustment,
etc. or financial support, etc.
* Foreign exchange rate decrease of more than 20% (foreign exchange gain): tariff adjustment,
etc. or redemption of foreign exchange gain by the State or local government
The extent of the provisions for tariff modification or government support, etc. due to foreign
exchange loss shall be agreed upon in the concession agreement within fifty percent (50%) of the
calculated foreign exchange loss. The calculated foreign exchange loss is the loss exceeding over
20% of the entire foreign exchange loss.
In the event of the occurrence of gain and loss in the foreign exchange, the contents, the
detailed procedures, and the period of risk sharing shall be agreed upon in the concession agreement.
2-2-6. Organizing concession contract
The contract is the legal instrument spelling out explicitly the key economic elements that the
government wants to cover in its agreement with the private operator. To a certain extent, the
regulator and government are captive to the concessionaire once the auction has been closed. Once
a contract has been awarded, the concessionaire has a significant incentive to negotiate on anything
that restricts its profits. So, the coverage of the contract must include a detailed description of the
object of the auction, the obligations and rights associated with this object, the process to follow,
and contingencies in case of unforeseen events. This is particularly important in countries in which
the legal system is not oriented toward contract law. (Estache & de Rus, 2000, p16)
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Criteria for an auction and bidding process
Organizing an auction and picking a winner can be done in many ways. Choosing the winner at an
auction for a concession or a service contract requires a good understanding of the trade-off
involved. In practice, however, in countries in which the governance structure is not reliable or well
tested, the rule of thumb to follow is straightforward: keep it simple, fair and transparent to
maximize the number of bidders, ensure the success of competition for the market, and minimize
the risks of corruption or unfair decisions. (Estache & de Rus, 2000, p23)
Estache and de Rus (2000) provide general bidding process as follows .
* Pre-qualification: the government provides information on the state of the assets, the value of the
business, and its contractor requirements to identify the potential bidders. This stage also includes
criteria for a technical and financial pre-qualification of the bidders. The potential bidders are told
the type of sanctions the regulators may impose if they do not deliver once they have won the
contract. This pre-qualification is not always necessary, but it is recommended. It minimizes the
risks of having incompetent, risk-taking investors trying to get into a business they do not know, or
of competent operators trying to commit to financing they cannot deliver.
* Auction: Auction is organized around two criteria consisting of technical and financial field.
These can be assessed in three ways as follows: (1) a two-stage selection that first eliminates the
weakest technical proposals, then picks the best economic offer among the remaining candidates;
(2) a single-stage proposal that ranks the offers according to a weighted average of the technical and
financial proposals; and (3) a procedure in which the government specifies the technology and all
the engineering aspects desired, and the bidders only compete on the financial dimension.
To actually pick a winner, more specific criteria are needed. This depends on the specific objectives
the government is trying to achieve. Table 3 suggests the optimal selection criteria for a spectrum of
possible objectives. Table 3 shows that trade-offs do indeed exist. For instance users are not
guaranteed to benefit from lower tariffs if the government has fiscal objectives in mind. Indeed, the
best way for a government to maximize the willingness of bidders to pay in an auction is to offer a
strong monopoly, which implies large potential profits through high tariffs. This strategy makes it
particularly difficult for a regulator to ensure efficiency and fairness because the contractor gets
contractual protection for the right to use its monopoly powers.
Table 3: Relation between privatization objectives and auction award criteria
Auction award criteria
Shortest Lowest Minimum Maximum Maximum Best Minimum
contract tariff subsidy payment to number of investment net
Privatization objectives duration requested the employees plan present
government retained value of
revenue
requested
Competition * * * * *
Infrastructure quality and *
capacity
Benefits to the users * * *
Reduction in fiscal deficit * *
Minimal political conflict *
* Indicates that the linkage is close
Source: Estache & de Rus, 2000
Based on analysis of road concession programs in Europe, French Highway Directorate (1999) also
confirms that there are also differences with respect to concession company selection criteria. In
1999, the main criteria used in Europe were: the amount of the public subsidy required, the
credibility of the financial arrangement, the technical quality of the project, operating strategy and
price policy, and the reputation of the concession (inclusion of a construction company amongst its
7 Estache and de Rus, 2000, pp 2 3 -2 4
shareholders, etc.)
Coverage of contract
The concession agreement can be designed in many ways. Indeed, in some countries the
government provides many of the details in the information sets provided to the bidders, and in
other countries, the government asks the bidders to make many of the suggestions to implement the
concession.
Estache, Romero and Strong (2000) provide a minimum list that the overall contract package needs
to cover to allow the regulator to referee in cases of conflicts between users and the concessionaire
or the government and the concessionaire. The list is as follows: definition of the legal context;
administrative background; estimate of the costs of the project; asset valuation rules, economic
content of the technical document; various types of guarantees and warrantees; identification of the
various types of risks and their distribution between the parties; concession rights and obligations;
penalty rules; regulatory regime; information the operator will be required to provide to the
regulator; acceptance conditions; limitations on competing facilities; rights to access third-party
operated facilities; assignment and termination of the concession; renegotiation rule; and dispute
resolution8 .
2-3. Summary
In many countries, transportation infrastructures and services have been managed by the public
sector with budgetary fund. But, the public management has resulted in inefficiency, lack of
creativity, extraordinary lifecycle costs. In addition, increasing demand of budget toward other
sector such as social welfares, make it more difficult to finance the transportation infrastructure
with budgetary funding. These problems have encouraged increasing private involvement in the
sector to achieve creativity and efficiency from private entities. Nevertheless, this implies that the
government needs to assume new responsibilities to regulate the privatization process, rather than
that the government is no longer needed. The worldwide experience of the past decades has
demonstrated that the government needs to assume new responsibilities through privatization
process.
The various studies as shown in this chapter have identified the need for government regulation in
private participation in infrastructure. And the studies argue that the regulation should be enhanced
mainly for setting the objectives of privatization clearly, creating competitive environment for the
market under monopoly issue, allocating various risks fairly between the parties, selecting
regulatory regime to control price and quality and to guarantee reasonable profit to a concessionaire,
managing government support and organizing concession contract properly.
s For detailed information, see Estache, Romero and Strong, 2000
Chapter 3. Private Participation in Infrastructure in KOREA
Korea has experienced rapid economic growth rate for more than decades. And, with the economic
expansion, demand for basic infrastructure services has outstripped the supply capacity of exiting
assets, which results in infrastructure deficits. If not eliminated, these deficits could create serious
obstacle to further economic growth as well as economic and social inequality leaving certain
segments of the population isolated from the benefits of the economic development.
Therefore, since 1994, policy decisions have been taken to introduce private capital in infrastructure
with a concession scheme, whereby a private firm would finance, build, operate the infrastructure
for maximum 30 years and recover its investment by collecting tariffs from users, to alleviate its
budgetary restriction of the government and allow more public resources to be devoted to other
social spending.
3-1. Purpose of Adopting Private Participation in Infrastructure
According to the Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure (The act on PPI, 1998), the purpose
of adopting private participation in infrastructure in Korea is to encourage the creativity and
efficiency in infrastructure facilities through the investment of the private sector.
In the Mid and Long Term SOC 9 Private Fund Investment Plan (2002-2011) made by the
government in 2001, the purpose is described in details focused on budget limitation to catch up
with future infrastructure demand. Considering increasing budget demands in other sectors-
especially in the welfare sector-and future demand of infrastructure itself, the government selects
private fund as an alternative to overcome its budget limitation.
9 SOC stands for Social Overhead Capital. It means main infrastructures such as road, railroad, seaport, airport, and etc in the government budge
related documents in Korea.
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Then, the government, for the public purpose, could spend some portion of budget saved from
private fund investment on developing undeveloped area balancing land development nationwide.
The government also expects to adopt "users pay tariff' principle in construction market and
increase private sector's role in infrastructure development.
3-2. Legal Frame of Private Participation in Infrastructure
3-2-1. The Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure (The Act on PPI, 1998)
The Korean government has been made various efforts to induce private fund investment in
infrastructures since it established the Act on inducement of Private Fund in infrastructure in 1994.
And the government amended the Act and renamed it the Act on Private Participation in
infrastructure (PPI Act) in 1998, improving its regulatory frame to overcome poor private
participation until then.
The Act on Inducement of Private Fund in Infrastructure (1994)
Even though the government continued to invest in infrastructure, the demand, since 1980, has
exceeded the supply of infrastructure and following traffic congestion and logistic costs have been
main problems for the government to solve. So, the government considered the private participation
as an alternative to catch up with the demand with private fund as well as to improve the
performance of infrastructures controlled by government and several public agencies with creativity
and efficiency from the private sector. Then, in 1991, the government proposed the Special Act on
Private Fund Inducement in Infrastructure to the National Assembly to make legal frame for private
participation. But, legislators argued that private participation in infrastructure and following
concession could be in extreme favor of certain private firms and denied the draft.
However, introducing successful cases about privatization of public agencies and private fund
investment in infrastructure and make consensus about positive effects of privatization, the
government was successful to make legal environment with establishment of the Act on Inducement
of Private Fund in Infrastructure in 1994.
The Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure (1998)
Despite the efforts in the government level, private participation was behind the schedule set by
government. Until 1998, 23 projects were announced as Projects for Private Participation in
Infrastructure (PPI projects), only 9 projects including the Incheon International Airport Highway
found their concessionaires. Furthermore, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 made the private sector
dubious about the future of private participation in infrastructure. So, the government recognized
the need of new incentive to induce the private fund. With this regard, in 1998, the amended law-
The Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure (The Act on PPI) was established with
government subsidy such as revenue guarantee of PPI projects. Under this law, the financial support
from government was possible up to 90% of expected revenue in the final agreement between the
government and the concessionaire to improve profitability of PPI projects and induce private fund.
And Private Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea (PICKO) with relevant experts in PPI
projects is established to support the government to regulate private participation.
3-2-2. Regulation of Private Investment Project Committee
Based on the Act on PPI, Private Investment Project Committee (the Committee) is in charge of
reviewing the following matters:
* Formulation of major policies concerning private sector investment in infrastructure;
* Establishment and modification of the annual plan for private participation in infrastructure;
* Establishment and modification of the instruction for proposal for private participation in
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infrastructure;
* Selection of a concessionaire;
* Cancellation of an announcement of solicited projects;
* Other matters which Minister of Planning and Budget proposes for promotion of active private
participation in infrastructure projects.
The Committee members are Vice Minister of Planning and Budget (the Chairman), other ten Vice
Ministers of Finance and Economy, of Government Administration and Home Affairs, of Culture
and Tourism, Agriculture and Forestry, of Industry and Resources, of Information and
Communication, of Environment, of Construction and Transportation, of Maritime Affairs and
Fisheries, of Science and Technology, and eight or fewer member-commissioned by the Chairman-
from the private sector with knowledge and experience in private investment. 10
If it is deemed that professional or technical advice is necessary for efficiency in the operation of
the Committee, the Chairman may establish an advisory sub committee composed of experts in the
related fields.
3-2-3. Selection of PPI projects
For solicited projects, the criteria of selection of PPI projects for solicited projects are follows:
* First, the type of projects should be one of the facilities as shown in the Table 5;
* Second, the project should be consistent with mid and long-term investment plan in infrastructure
and the national investment priorities of the Government;
* Third, the project should be profitable-based on the result of its feasibility study-to induce private
investment.
10 Before Marl2, 2003, the members are in the Minister level. Vice Minister of Science and Technology is added in the amended Enforcement Decree
To screen feasibility of large government projects more carefully and independently under the
integrated system managed by Ministry of Planning and Budget, preliminary feasibility study is
enforced with amendment of Enforcement Decree of the Budget and Accounts Act in 1999. Before
introduction of preliminary feasibility study, the budgetary projects had been implemented
according to feasibility study managed by competent authority and hence credibility and
objectiveness of that feasibility study and fairness of budget allocation had been on debate.
The preliminary study is for large projects above 50 billion Won of total cost, focusing on B/C
analysis with supplementary criteria such as compliance to Government mid and long term
investment plans and attribution to balanced land development nationwide. This study has been
done by Public Investment Management Center (PIMA), established as a public institute in the
Korea Development Institute (KDI) in 2000, for expertise in the field and supporting the MPB.
And MPB now is considering other private institute and private firms as well as PIMA for the
needed expertise and higher objectiveness. As shown in the Table 4, during 1999-2002, 120 projects
planned by various Ministries and local governments are screened by preliminary study and 66
projects have been suspended because of poor feasibility and lower priority (MPB, 2002).
Table 4: Preliminary feasibility study
Billion Won
Year Projects planned Projects approved Projects suspended
Number Project cost Number Project cost Number Project cost
estimate estimate estimate
1999 19 26,663.9 12 6,868.3 7 19,795.6
2000 30 13,888.6 15 6,027.3 15 7,861.3
2001 41 19,765.5 14 6,423.2 27 13,342.3
2002 30 16,583.5 13 6,199.2 17 10,384.3
Sum 120 76,901.5 54 25,518.8 66 51,383.5
Source: MPB, 2002
of the Act on PPI as of Mar 12, 2003.
In the same context, Private Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea (PICKO) is established in
the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) for supporting the government in the
process of implementing of private participation in infrastructure.
With the criteria and review of the committee, based on relevant preliminary feasibility study, the
competent authority decides whether a project is selected as a PPI project. The summarized
information is in the Figure 2.
3-2-4. Selection of Concessionaire
Process of selection of concessionaire is summarized in the Figure 3.
Step 1: Formulation and Announcement of the Instruction for Proposal (by competent authority)
The competent authority shall formulate an instruction for proposal for private participation in
infrastructure (instruction for proposal). The contents shall be published thereof in the official
gazette and at least three daily newspapers. In order for the competent authority to announce the
instruction for proposal for projects requiring a total project cost of 200 billion Won or more, the
proposal shall be reviewed by the Committee in advance. The competent authority may consult with
PICKO for its advisory opinion in the formulation of the instruction for proposal. In particular, the
instruction for proposal requiring the deliberation of the Committee shall be reviewed by PICKO
prior to such deliberation.
Step 2: Submission of Project Proposal (by Private Sector)
Any party intending to implement a private investment project shall submit a project proposal to the
competent authority, in accordance with the laws and regulations concerning the private investment
project, the contents of the announced instruction for proposal, etc.
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Step 3: Examination and Evaluation of Project Proposal (by Competent Authority & PICKO)
The competent authority designates a potential concessionaire after examining and evaluating the
project proposal submitted by the private sector. At least two (2) potential concessionaires shall be
selected, except for special circumstances. The competent authority shall establish and operate a
team for evaluating project proposals (evaluation team). The Director of PICKO may designate
person(s) to participate in the evaluation team.
Criteria for evaluation in the project proposal are as follows:
* Composition of the concessionaire such as the structural make-up of the organization of the
concessionaire, the relationship between the project investor and the concessionaire, etc
* Feasibility of the project proposal such as the total project cost, construction period,
construction site and content of construction, etc
* Financing plan such as equity and loan arrangement capacity, etc.
* Economic feasibility of the project such as tariff, amount of use, concession period, period of
ownership and profit-making operation, rate of return, scale of supplementary projects, if any, etc.
* Land acquisition plan such as the size of land already acquired, the feasibility of the land
acquisition plan, etc.
* Technology applied in construction such as the capacity to fulfill the minimum requirement for
technology, the applicability of the latest construction technology, etc.
* Facility management capability such as the appropriateness of the maintenance plan, the
operation and management plan, etc
* Contribution to the public interest such as the provision of service to the facility user(s), etc
* Other matters which the competent authority deems necessary
The competent authority may adjust the items to be evaluated according to the special
characteristics and needs of the project concerned and give proper weight to particular items for the
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purpose of evaluation. And the competent authority may set the criteria for pre-qualification (PQ) of
the proposers. The technical skills may be evaluated in the first step of the evaluation and specific
matters such as financing ability, level of tariff, etc. shall be evaluated second, as deemed necessary
by the competent authority.
Step 4: Designation of Concessionaire and Conclusion of Concession Agreement
The competent authority designates a concessionaire by finalizing all negotiations of a
concession agreement with the potential concessionaire, which includes terms and conditions of the
project implementation.
The competent authority shall consult with PICKO when finalizing the negotiation for the
concession agreement on projects requiring a total project cost of 200 billion Won or more. For
concession agreement that includes a section promising government support, the competent
authority must refer to the opinion of the Minister of Planning and Budget.
Table 5: Infrastructure Facility Types Defined by The Act on PPI in Korea (34 types)
Sector Competent Ministry Infrastructure Facility Types
Roads and its ancillary facilities, non-roadRoad (3) MOCT
parking lots, intelligent transportation system
KNR Railways
Railways (2)
MOCT Urban railways
Harbor facilities, fishing port facilities,MOMAF
Harbor (3) combined passenger facilities
Airport (1) MOCT Airport facilities
MOCT Multi-purpose dams, river-affiliated ancillary
Water Resources (4) structures
MOE Sewage, waterworks
Telecommunication facilities, informationCommunication (2) MOIC
system
Electric source facilities, gas supply facilities,
Energy MOIR
collective energy facilities
Waste disposal facilities, excreta treatment
facilities, public treatment facilities of
Environment (6) MOE livestock waste water, waste water disposal
facilities, recycling facilities, sewage terminal
disposal facilities
Distribution complex, cargo terminals andDistribution (3) MOCT
warehouses, passenger terminals
Tourist resorts and resort complex, youth
Ministry of Culture and training facilities, public sports facilities,
Culture & Tourism (7) Tourism libraries, museums and art galleries,
international conference facilities
MOCT Urban parks
Note: MOCT: Ministry of Construction and Transportation, KNR: Koran National Railroad, MOE:
Ministry of Environment, MOIC: Ministry of Information and Communication, MOIR: Ministry of
Industry and Resources.
Source: MPB, 2002
Figure 2: Procedure for Selection of PPI Projects (Solicited Project)
The head of central government agency -The Minister
of the Ministry of Planning and Budget
Projects requiring a total project cost of 50 billion Won or
more and Projects requiring governmental support of 30
billion Won or more
I
Designation of projects
for a Preliminary
Feasibility study
Implementation of
preliminary
Feasibility study
V V
Government Potential private
Financing project Investment project
NO YES
V
*0
*0
Ministry of Planning and Budget
(Preliminary Feasibility Study Committee)
Korean Development Institute, Korea Research Institute for
Human Settlements, The Korean Transport Institute, etc.
Result of preliminary feasibility study
Relevant Ministry -- research institute, etc.
Review (as per PICKO)
Competent authority--Ministry of Planning and Budget (with
Application for private
exception of Project requiring total project cost of less thanInvestment project
200 billion Won)
V
Designation and public
Notification of the
solicited project
* Project cost ranging from 50 billion Won to less than
200 billion Won: Autonomous designation by competent
authority and notification to MPB after announcement
* Project cost of 200 billion Won or more: designation of
solicited project after deliberation by Committee
Source: MPB, 2000b
Application for
preliminary
feasibility study of the
project
I
Figure 3: Procedure for Selecting a Concessionaire for Solicited PPI Projects
<Concessionaire> <Government> <Main contents>
A list of MPB-managed project is to be announced
in the Annual Plan for Private Participation in
Infrastructure
* Matters to be deliberated by the Committee
I
Concessionaire designation procedure and the
government support, etc. are to be indicated.
Prior consultation with PICKO is required
* Project requiring total project cost of
200billion Won or more are subject to
deliberation by the Committee
Key elements are to be summarized and
announced in English
Submission of
project proposal
V
Project plan evaluation task force team is to be
organized and operated
PQ and/or 2-step evaluation is possible
More than 2 potential concessionaire are to be
selected
I
Determination of the project implementation
conditions including total project cost,
concession period, tariff, etc.
Prior consultation with PICKO on draft of
concession agreement is required
*Projects requiring total project cost of 500 billion
Won or more are subject to deliberation by the
Committee
Source: MPB, 2000b
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(as per Ministry of Planning &
Budget)
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Of Instruction for proposal
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project Proposal
(selection of potential
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Designation of Concessionaire
Through conclusion Of concession
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3-3. Status of SOC Investment
The government has tried to increase SOC investment to catch up with its investment schedule for
industrial competitiveness in global market since in the late 1990s. The Table 6 shows annual SOC
investment in GDP during 1995-2000 and the Table 7 shows annual SOC investment in government
budget during 1995-2003. The percentage of SOC investment out of total GDP is 2.4 % in average
during that period, and the ratio has been increased after Asian financial crisis in 1997. SOC
investment has occupied an average 14.3% of total annual budget during 1995-2003.
Table 6: Annual SOC investment in GDP
Trillion Won
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GDP 377.3 418.5 453.3 444.4 482.7 517.1
SOC investment 6.7 8.3 10.3 11.6 13.5 14.2
SOC/GDP 1.78% 1.98% 2.27% 2.61% 2.80% 2.75%
Source: MPB, 2001
Table 7: Annual SOC investment in Government Budget
Trillion Won
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Amount 54.8 63.0 71.4 80.8 88.5 94.9 106.1 109.6 111.5
Budget Increase 15.6% 15.0% 13.3% 13.2% 9.5% 7.2% 11.8% 3.29% 1.73%
rate
SOC Amount 6.7 8.3 10.3 11.6 13.5 14.2 15.2 15.98 16.69
investment Increase 19.6% 23.9% 24.3% 12.6% 16.4% 5.2% 7.0% 5.1% 4.44%
rate
SOC/Total Budget 12.2% 13.2% 14.4% 14.4% 15.3% 15.0% 14.3% 14.6% 15.0%
Source: Lee, 2003 & MPB, 2001
3-4. Actual implementation of PPI projects
Since 1995, the total 128 projects with total cost of 40.6 trillion Won have been announced as PPI
projects. Among them, 83 projects (65%) have found private participants: 27 projects (21%) are
under operation; 33 projects (26%) are under construction; and 23 projects (18%) are under final
agreements. Since then, the actual private fund investment has increased to occupy 9.6 % of total
infrastructure investment of 17.7 trillion Won (budgetary fund: 16, private fund: 1.7) in 2002.
3-4-1 Definitions
Based on "The Private Participation in Infrastructure Annual Plan for the Year 2002, 2002" Private
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) can be categorized as follows:
* MPB-managed Proiects: if the total cost of the project is over 200 billion Korean Won the project
is managed by Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) and included in the Private Participation in
Infrastructure Annual Plan based on the Act on PPI.
* Non MPB-managed Proiects: compared to MPB-managed projects, if the total cost of the project
is under 200 billion Korean Won the project is managed by other competent central government (for
example, Ministry of Construction and Transportation, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries)
or competent local government.
* Solicited Projects: these projects are planned by the central or local governments and
implemented by MPB-managed projects or Non MPB-managed projects according to their total
costs.
* Unsolicited Proiects: unlike solicited projects, unsolicited projects are proposed by private sector.
Then, after review defined in the Act on PPI and other procedure, it can be selected and
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implemented as PPI projects.
3-4-2 Aggregated Data of implementation of PPI projects
Since 1994, 128 projects have been announced as PPI projects. Ministry of Planning and Budget
have managed 37 projects, and other authorities have controlled residual 91 projects as shown in the
table 8. Among 128 projects 94 projects have planned by the government as solicited projects, and
residual 34 projects have been proposed by private sector as unsolicited projects.
Table 8: The number of projects announced as PPI project in Korea
MPB-managed Projects Non MPB-managed Projects
Total Sub sum Solicited Unsolicited Sub sum Solicited Unsolicited
128 37 30 7 91 64 27
Source: Adopted from MPB, 2002 & Huh, 2003
Among the 128 projects announced as PPI projects. Among them, 83 projects (65%) have found
private participants: 27 projects (21%) are under operation; 33 projects (26%) are under
construction; and 23 projects (18%) are under final agreements. The Table 9 shows the
implementation status of the projects.
Table 9: The implementation status of 128 PPI projects
Implementatio FinalSum Operation Construction Others
n Status Agreement
The number of
128 27 33 23 45Projects
Percentage 100 21% 26% 18% 35%
Table 10 shows the type and cost of PPI projects. Their total project cost is 40.6 trillion Won
including government subsidy. Among them, roads and tunnels occupies the largest portion (48%,
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19.4 trillion Won) in terms of project cost. Environmental facilities have the largest number of
projects (33 projects, 26%), but their portion in the total project cost is just below 5%.
Table 10: Type and cost of projects announced as PPI project in Korea
Trillion Won
Airport Road Parking Environ
Type Railroad Tourism Others Total
Seaport Tunnel Lot ment
Number of
15 7 31 23 33 9 10 128
Projects
Cost of
4.5 9.4 19.4 0.2 1.9 1.7 3.5 40.6
Projects
Source: MPB, 2003
Table 11 shows actual private fund investment in PPI projects. In 1995, private fund was just 0.1%
of government fund invested in SOC. But, private fund investment portion continues to increase up
to 10.6% in 2002.
Table 11: Actual Private investment in the SOC Investment in Korea
Trillion Won
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Government Fund 6.7 8.3 10.3 11.7 13.5 14.2 15.2 16.0
Private Fund 0.01 0.05 0.3 0.5 0.8 1 0.6 1.7
Private/Government 0.1% 0.6% 2.9% 4.3% 5.9% 7% 3.9% 10.6%
Source: Adopted from MPB, 2003
3-4-3 MPB-managed PPI projects
Since 10 projects over individual projects cost of 200 billion Won were announced as PPI projects
total 37 MPB managed projects have been selected as PPI projects as shown in the Table 12. In the
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beginning period, the announcement was relatively active, but recent status is not as active as the
past.
Table 12: The number of projects selected as MPB-managed project in Korea (1995-2002)
Source: Adopted from MPB, 2002
Table 13 shows the detailed list of 37 projects. As shown in the Table 13, among 37 projects, 4
projects including Incheon International Airport Highway are under operation, 6 projects are under
construction, 5 projects are about to be constructed after finalizing concession agreement, 20
projects are under negotiation between the government and the possible concessionaire, and 2
projects just made the RFP in public. Among these 37 large projects, 7 projects have been proposed
by the private sector and this expansion of unsolicited projects has been conspicuous since 2000.
Even though expansion of private participation in large projects, higher construction costs
compared with budgetary funding projects and users' complaints against higher tariff has been
recognized. Hah and Moh also argue that the construction costs of winning bidders are about 83%
of estimate reference prepared by the government in the budgetary funding projects, but in case of
PPI projects, they are around 90% and relatively higher. And the toll rates of these projects are 2-2.5
times higher than the rate (38.1Won/km) of other toll roads managed by the public agency, which
leads to complaints of users as well as residents along the road. Hah and Moh also argue that
concession authority has experienced head to head competition from bidders in only 3 projects out
of 37 MPB-managed projects: Incheon Int'l Airport Cargo Terminal; Pusan-Kimhae Light Rail
Transit; Uijongbu Light Rail Transit (Hah and Moh, 2003).
Table 13: MPB-Managed Private Participation Projects in Korea (37 projects)
Status Competent Authority Project
Incheon Int'l Airport Expressway,
Operation MOCT (3) Incheon Int'l Airport Cargo Terminal,
(4 Projects) Cheonan-Nonsan Expressway
Kwangju Metro City (1) Kwangju Second Ring Road 1st Sector
MOCT (2) Taegu-Pusan ExpresswaySeoul Beltway (Ilsan-Taegaewon)
Construction MOMAF (2) Pusan New Port, Mokpo Outer Port-Phase I(6 Projects) Seoul Metro City (1) Seoul Mt. Umyeon Tunnel
KNR (1) Incheon Int'l Airport Railroad
MOCT (2) Honam Cargo Terminal, Kyungin Canal
Final agreement MOMAF (1) Incheon North Harbor
(5 Projects) Seoul Metro City (1) Seoul Gangnam Circulatory Urban Expressway*
Kyunggi Province (1) Ilsan Grand Bridge
Seoul-Hanam Light Rail Transit(LRT)
Pusan-Kimhae LRT, The 2 nd Younyuk Bridge*
Seoul-Chunchon Expressway*
Seosuwon-Osan-Pyungtaek Expressway*
Pusan Metro City (3) Pusan-Geoje Link, Pusan Choub LRT,
Pusan Coastal Ring Road (North Harbor Bridge)
Kyunggi Province (1) Namdong, Inchon-Dori, Siheung IC
Pucheon City (1) Kyungin Bypass Roads
Negotiation for
final agreement Kyungnam Province(1) Machang Grand Bridge
(20 Projcets) Incheon (1) Yongyu-Muwi Tourist Complex*
Masan Port -Phase I, Pohang-Youngil Port,
Ulsan New Port Project-Phase I
Seoul Metro City (1) Seoul Urban Railway No9- Phase I
Jeonbuk Province (1) Jeonbuk sewage facility*
Kimpo City (1) Gochon-Wolghot Road
Uijongbu City (1) Uijongbu LRT
Yongin City (1) Yongin LRT
Notification for MOCT (2) Central Area Compound Cargo Terminal
RFP (2 Projects) Youngnam Area Compound Cargo Terminal
Total MOCT: 14, MOMAF: 6, KNR: 1, and 11 Local Governments: 16(37 projects)
Note: MOCT: Ministry of Construction and Transportation, MOMAF: Ministry of Maritime Affairs
and Fisheries, KNR: Korean National Railroad, * Indicates unsolicited projects.
Source: MPB, 2002
And actual traffic of most toll road under are operation under 65% of expected demand in final
concession agreements, even though the operation is just in the beginning stage and one can rule
out possibility of increasing traffic in the future (Huh, 2003). For instance, Cheonan-Nonsan
Expressway under operation has experienced only below 40 % of expected demand. This could lead
to unexpected budgetary burden due to government's compensation up to 90% of expected revenue
based on the concession agreement. (Chosun, 2003) This optimistic demand forecasting trend will
be discussed in details with demand forecast risk allocation and negative impacts of government
income guarantee in Chapter 3.
Financial source of MPB managed projects is described in the Table 14. About 74.5 percent of the
project costs is supported by private sector. And 25.5 percent is from government subsidy.
In total private funds excluding government subsidy, equity portion is about 28%, because the
government requires investors provide minimum 25% of private fund as equity investment. With
this regard, arguing that the regulation could be a burden for investors and a obstacle to active
participation of private entities sector, Lee suggest that subordinated loans can be included in the
minimum 25% equity portion to alleviate the burden (Lee, 2003)
Table 14: Financial Source of Selected MPB-Managed PPI Projects in Korea*
Government Investors Lenders
Financial Source Sum Others(Subsidy) (Equity) (Debt)
Amount (Trillion Won) 34.4381 8.7940 7.1859 17.9721 0.4861
Percentage (%) 100 25.5 20.9 52.2 1.4
*This comes from 35 projects excluding 2 projects under notification of RFP from 37 projects
Source: Lee, 2003
Table 15 shows investor breakdown of selected 15 MPB projects. Domestic construction companies
occupy 86% of investors investing 3.95 trillion Won out of total equity, 4.59 trillion Won. They are
most active in the PPI projects as investors as well as construction contractors in the PPI projects.
But, on the other hand, the Table 15 also shows lack of diversity of financial source. Furthermore,
construction companies have difficulties financing large and long term investment in itself, and
hence have to focus on short term recovery from profit of construction itself rather than creating
efficiency and creativeness through lifecycle of a infrastructure (Lee, 2003). One of the main
reasons that a lot of projects have been successful finding a concessionaire is that some construction
companies, with expectation of government guarantee not to abandon the projects, want to keep
them rolling adding amount of their projects awarded by the government (PIMA, 2000). This
problem also will be discussed in the context of strategic optimism in private firms in Chapter 4.
Table 15: Investor Breakdown of Selected MPB-Managed PPI Projects in Korea*
Sum Construction Insurance
Investor Others Public(Equity) Companies Companies
Amount
4.5858 3.9501 0.1300 0.2300 0.2726(Trillion Won)
Percentage (%) 100 86.1 2.8 5.1 6.0
*This comes from 15 projects under operation, construction, or reaching final agreement, excluding
20 projects under negotiation or notification of RFP in the previous table
Source: Lee, 2003
The composition of lenders is shown in the Table 16. Domestic Banks are most active lenders in
PPI projects and support 68.6 % of total debt. In the second place, domestic insurance companies
occupy 13.1%. Foreign fund occupies just 6.5% of total debt amount of selected 21 PPI projects.
The table shows clearly dominance of domestic fund. Lee argue that country risk, in the context of
privatization in Korea, is recognized higher by foreign investors and lenders than expected by the
government, mainly due to exchange rate risk, and the foreign fund seems not competitive in
domestic market (Lee, 2003)
Table 16: Lender Breakdown of Selected PPI Projects in Korea*
Trillion Won
Type
Lender PercentageLoan Bond Sum Percentage
Bank 2.2740 1.8690 4.1430 68.6%
Life Insurance
0.5581 0.1300 0.6881 11.4%Company
Damage InsuranceDomestic Fund 0.0730 0.0300 0.1030 1.7%
Company
Government 0.0151 0.1000 0.0151 1.9%
Others 0.1486 0.1500 0.2986 4.9%
National Pension Fund - 0.3000 0.3000 5.0%
Foreign Fund 0.2600 0.1300 0.3900 6.5%
Sum 3.3288 2.7090 6.0378 100%
* This comes from selected 21 projects from MPB managed PPI projects as well as Non-MPB
managed Projects as of Dec., 2002
Source: Lee, 2003 & PICKO, 2002
3-4-4. Non MPB-managed PPI projects
As shown in the Table 17, the total number of Non MPB-managed PPI projects is 91. Among 91
projects, 23 projects are under operation, 27 projects are under construction, 18 projects are about to
be constructed after finalizing concession agreement, 18 projects are under negotiation between the
government and the possible concessionaire, 3 projects made the RFP in public, and 2 projects are
under review.
Environmental facilities, with 32 projects, occupy 35% of these smaller projects below total project
cost of 200 billion Won. And active parking lot development with 23 projects is also unique part of
this area. Transportation sector has 23 projects. Transportation facilities and services are active in
both larger MPB-managed projects and smaller Non MPB-managed projects.
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Table 17: Non MPB-Managed Private Participation Projects in Korea (91 Projects)
Implementation Total Transportation Parking Lot Tourism Environmental
Status Facilities
Operation 23 projects 10 8 3 2
Construction 27 projects 8 5 6 8
Final Agreement 18 projects - 9 2 7
Negotiation for 18 projects 5 1 2 10
agreement
Notification for 3 projects - - - 3
RFP
Under Scrutiny 2 projects - - - 2
Total 91 projects 23 projects 23 projects 13 projects 32 projects
Road: 6 Tourism Sewage: 24
Tunnel: 8 Complex Incinerator: 3
Seaport: 3 Development: 8 Recycling: 3
Airport: 6 Others: 5 Others: 2
Solicited: 64 Solicited: 16 Solicited: 19 Solicited: 11 Solicited: 18
Unsolicited: 27 Unsolicited: 7 Unsolicited: 4 Unsolicited: 2 Unsolicited: 14
Source: Huh, 2003 & PICKO, 2002
Table 18 shows financial source of the 91 Non MPB-managed PPI projects. Like MPB-managed
projects, 76 percent of total project cost comes from private fund. The residual 24 % is expected to
be supported by Central and local government.
Table 18: Financial Source of Non MPB-Managed PPI Projects in Korea (91 Projects)
Central Local
Private
Source Sum Government Government OthersFund
Fund Fund
Amount 5.5839 0.8194 5,243 4.2386 0.0016(Trillion Won)
Percentage (%) 100 14.7 9.4 75.9
Source: Lee, 2003 & PICKO, 2002
3-5. Long Term Plan for Private Participation in Infrastructure
The government made several long term investment plan in infrastructure during 2000-2020 to
catch up with the increasing demand in the sector, and, based on them, made a updated mid-long
term private fund investment plan during 2002-2011.
The plan requires 198.9 trillion Won among which the government expects to provide 159.2-180.4
trillion Won from its budget and the rest 18.5-39.7 trillion Won from private fund. With this regard,
the government also made the list of future PPI projects as a reference to manage the future PPI
projects, which consist of 179 projects with total cost estimate of 63 trillion Won as will be
explained in this chapter.
3-5-1 Future Demand of Infrastructure Investment
The government made several mid and long-term investment plans in infrastructure during 2000-
2020 to catch up with the increasing demand. According to the three government plans, future SOC
demand is shown as follows:
* The Ist Mid-term Transportation Investment Plan (2000-2004): During 2000-2004, total 100
trillion Won (road 54.7%, railroad 28.7%, Airport 4.6%, Seaport 9.9%, Logistics and others 2.1%)
is required to construct transportation facilities;
* The National Transportation Network Plan (2000-2019): During 2000-2019, total 335 trillion
Won (road 55.5%, railroad 28.1%, Airport 4.2%, Seaport 11%, Logistics 1.2%) is required in SOC
sector;
* The 4 th Land Development Plan (2001-2020): During 2000-2019, total 343 trillion Won (road
57.1%, railroad 21.3%, Airport 4.5%, Seaport 11.1%, Logistics 6%) is required in SOC sector;
And this information is summarized in the Table 19.
Table 19: SOC Investment Demand in the Three Government Plans
The 1st Mid-term The National The 4m National Land
Sector Transportation Investment Transportation Network Development Plan (2001-
Plan (2000-2004) Plan (2000-2019) 2020)
Road 54.7 186.3 196.4
Railroad 28.6 94.0 72.9
Airport 4.6 13.7 15.6
Seaport 9.9 36.8 38.3
Logistics 2.1 3.9 20.0
Sum 100 335 343
Source: Adopted from MPB,2001
Then, during 2002-2001, SOC investment demand is calculated mainly based on the the 1st Mid-
term Transportation Investment Plan (2000-2004) and other two plans. During 2002-2011, total
198.9 trillion Won is required and Table 20 shows the details.
Table 20: SOC Investment Demand (2002-2011)
Investment Demand Percentage
(Trillion Won) (%)
Road 109.3 54.9
Railroad 57.2 28.8
Airport 6.6 3.3
Seaport 22.5 11.3
Logistics 3.3 1.7
Sum 198.9 100
Source: MPB, 2001
3-5-2. Forecasting of Private Fund Demand for Infrastructure Investment Demand
According to the three government plans, the available government fund is forecasted from 12.5
trillion Won to 16.0 trillion Won annually as shown in the table 21.
Table 21: Forecasting of Available Government Fund for SOC Investment
Trillion Won
The 1st Mid-term The National The 4th National Land
Sector Transportation Investment Transportation Network Development Plan (2001-
Plan (2000-2004) Plan (2000-2019) 2020)
Demand 100 335 343
SupplySupply 69.9 250 320From
Government (14.0/year) (12.5/year) (16.0/year)
Source: Adopted from MPB, 2001
Referring to the above results and adding some assumptions"1 , the government expects to provide
159.2(16/year)-180.4(18/year) trillion Won for SOC investment during 2002-2011. Therefore, it is
forecasted that 18.5-39.7 trillion Won should be provided from private sector through PPI projects.
This result is detailed in the Table 22.
3-5-3 Potential PPI projects during 2002-2011
To manage the future PPI projects systematically, the government selected 179 projects as Potential
PPI projects as a reference in the Mid and Long Term SOC Private Fund Investment Plan during
2002-2011 (MPB, 2001). They could be announced as actual PPI projects and implemented through
private participation if they are proved to be appropriate as detailed feasibility study later and
succeed to find a concessionaire.
" For this calculation, annual GDP increase rate is assumed as 4-6% and SOC/GDP is assumed as 2.4% based on the Table 6.
Table 22: Expectation of Financial Source of SOC Investment Demand
Trillion Won
Investment Available PPI Projects Government
Sector Demand Government Funded Project
Fund (A) Private Government Sum (A-C)
fund (B) Subsidy (C) (B+C)
Road 109.3 85.8-97.5 11.8-23.5 5.1-10.1 16.9-33.6 75.7-92.4
Railroad 57.2 46.3-52.6 4.6-10.9 3.1-7.3 7.7-18.2 39.0-49.5
Airport 6.6 6.2-6.6 0-0.4 0-0.2 0-0.6 6.0-6.6
Seaport 22.5 18.2-20.6 1.9-4.3 1.3-2.9 3.2-7.2 15.3-19.3
Logistics 3.3 2.7-3.1 0.2-0.6 0.1-0.1 0.3-0.7 2.6-3.0
Sum 198.9 159.2-180.4 18.5-39.7 9.6-20.6 28.1-60.3 138.6-170.8
Note: Total available government fund is allocated to each sector as follows: road 53.9%, railroad 29.1%, airport 3.9%,
seaport 11.4%, and logistics 1.7% based on analysis about future trend of each sector.
Source: MPB, 2001
The projects are selected based on different criteria according to facility type-such as road, railroad,
airport, seaport, logistics, environmental facilities, energy facilities, and tourism facilities. But in
general, relevance to government long-term master plan, brief B/C analysis, profitability, size and
etc are considered.
Total cost estimate of the 179 projects is 63.2 trillion Won. With regard to financial source, 46.7
trillion Won is expected to be from private sector and residual 16.4 trillion Won is supposed to be
funded by government subsidy.
Among 179 projects, transportation sector- such as road, railroad, airport, seaport and etc-occupies
72 projects (40 trillion Won), other sector-such as environmental facilities, energy facilities and etc-
has 107 projects (23.2 trillion Won). These projects are summarized in the Table 2312
12 For more detailed information such as individual project profile and criteria for selection and etc, see "the Mid and Long Term SOC Private Fund
Investment Plan during 2002-2011 (MPB, 2001)" in Korean
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Table 23: Summary of Potential PPI Projects and Financial Source
Highway
Local road with
government support
Local road
Sub sum
National network
Urban railroad
Light Rail Transit
Sub sum
Trade Harbor
Fishery Harbor
Park etc
Passenger facility
Sub Sum
Logistics
Sum
Environmental facilities
Energy facilities
Tourism facilities
Sum
Potential Project
Numb
er
4
4
5
3
15
23
23
2
3
1
29
2
89
13
5
107
179
Item
Source: MPB, 2001
Government
Subsidy
Estimate
3,458.0
485.8
1,718.4
5,662.2
Item
Road
Railroad
Seaport
Transpo
rtation
Others
Private
Fund
Estimate
8,068.6
1,133.6
4,009.5
13,211.7
Cost
Estimate
11,526.6
1,619.4
5,727.9
18,873.9
5,200.1
1,329.6
6,774.5
13,304.2
6,001.2
140.4
837.9
22.3
7,001.8
867.9
40,049.6
3,942.5
14,419.3
4,764.7
23,126.5
63,176.1Total
13,958.5
1,769.3
714.7
2,484.0
16,442.5
2,080.0
531.9
2,709.8
5,321.7
2,400.5
56.1
335.2
8.9
2,800.7
173.9
3,120.1
797.7
4,064.7
7,982.5
3,600.7
84.3
502.7
13.4
4201.1
695.8
26,091.1
2,173.2
14,419.3
4,050.0
20,642.5
46,733.6
3-6. Summary
Korea has experienced rapid economic growth rate for more than decades. And, with the economic
expansion, demand for basic infrastructure services has outstripped the supply capacity of exiting
assets, which results in infrastructure deficits. If not eliminated, these deficits could create serious
obstacle to further economic growth as well as economic and social inequality leaving certain
segments of the population isolated from the benefits of the economic development. Therefore,
since 1994, policy decisions have been taken to introduce private capital in infrastructure with a
concession scheme, whereby a private firm would finance, build, operate the infrastructure for
maximum 30 years and recover its investment by collecting tariffs from users, to alleviate its
budgetary restriction of the government and allow more public resources to be devoted to other
social spending.
With this regard, the government made several long-term investment plan in infrastructure during
2000-2020 to catch up with the increasing demand in the sector, and, based on them, made a
updated mid-long term private fund investment plan during 2002-2011. The plan requires 198.9
trillion Won among which the government expects to provide 159.2-180.4 trillion Won from its
budget and the rest 18.5-39.7 trillion Won from private fund.
Since 1995, the total 128 projects with total cost of 40.6 trillion Won have been announced as PPI
projects. Among them, 83 projects (65%) have found private participants: 27 projects (21%) are
under operation; 33 projects (26%) are under construction; and 23 projects (18%) are under final
agreements. Since then, the actual private fund investment has increased to occupy 9.6 % of total
infrastructure investment of 17.7 trillion Won (budgetary fund: 16, private fund: 1.7) in 2002. And
the government also made the list of future PPI projects as a reference to manage the future PPI
projects, which consist of 179 projects with total cost estimate of 63 trillion Won.
On one hand, such quantitative expansion of private fund investment has been appraised in terms of
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attenuating budgetary limitation and following allowance of investment in other social sectors, and
on the other hand, qualitative results of PPI projects have been on debate such as lack of diversity
of financial source, higher construction costs compared with budgetary funding projects and users'
complaints against higher tariff, lack of competition, tedious and lengthy process of negotiation and
screening of average 3-4 years from announcement of a concession project to approval of
implementation plan of a concessionaire, too generous revenue guarantee and following budgetary
burden, and optimistic demand forecasts.
One of the main problems is that government guarantee up to 90% of expected revenue. Even
though the Act on PPI and its Enforcement Decree provide a legal ground that the concession
authority could guarantee, in maximum, 90 % of expected revenue for a concessionaire and the
certain amount of guarantee should be decided through negotiation, actual concession agreement
have maximum guarantee range of 90%. And this mechanism is criticized as a systemic regime to
reduce incentive of private participants to screen the feasibility of projects and result in optimistic
demand forecasts. This issue will be discussed in details in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4. Demand forecasting and risk allocation in transportation infrastructures
4-1. Level of influence of decision making based on demand forecasts
When the policy makers decide whether to get a transportation project started, based on a feasibility
study, one of the main factors is future demand forecast in such transportation infrastructure. When
the forecast is poorly estimated, it can lead to a considerable misuse of resources otherwise can
support other feasible projects. However in real world, this is the case with biased overestimation of
future demand from strategic optimism in the public and private sector, which will be discussed in
this chapter.
Before the detailed discussion, Figure 4 shows the importance of initial review of project feasibility
including demand forecasting and following decision to go ahead with certain projects.
Figure 4: Level of influence on project costs
100%
OVOS~
Source: Paulson (1976)
Figure 4 illustrates essential features
of the level-of-influence concept. The
lower portion simplifies the life of a
project in three phases: (1) feasibility
studies, engineering and design, (2)
construction, and (3) operation. The
upper portion consists of two main
curves. The curve descending from
the left-hand with project time shows
the decreasing level of influence. And
the curve ascending toward right-
hand is accumulative expenditure.
In early stage of feasibility studies,
preliminary design, and even detail design, the relative expenditures are small compared with those
of the project as a whole; typically, engineering and design fees amount to well under 10 percent of
total construction costs. However, despite the smaller expenditure, decisions and commitments
made during that period have far greater influence. The first decision is to build or not to build.
Then, other decisions such as-two lanes or fore lanes?, toll funding or budgetary funding?, and etc.-
follow. In earlier stage than this, the policy makers could face to select one project rather than other
projects based on their priority comparison due to limited government budget. As these decisions
evolved and commitments made, the remaining level of influence on what the project costs will
ultimately become drops precipitously. (Paulson, 1976 and 1992)
4-2. Overoptimistic demand forecasting
4-2-1. Overoptimistic demand forecasting in real world
Frequent failures of demand forecasting are fairly biased toward overestimation. Skamris and
Flyvberg (1997) provide useful documents about overoptimistic forecasts as well as cost overruns
in large transport infrastructure projects in the UK, US, Sweden, Denmark and as well as
developing countries as summarized in the Table 24, Table 25, and Table 26. From the projects
examined, they conclude as follows: 13
Cost overruns of 50-100% are common for large transport infrastructure projects and overruns
above 100% are not common. Traffic forecasts that are out by 20-60% compared with actual
development are common for these projects. Forecasts of project viability for large transport
infrastructure projects are often over-optimistic to a degree where such forecasts correspond poorly
with actual development (Skamris and Flyvberg, 1997, p 145).
Table 24: Percentage distribution of cost development in 41 transport infrastructure projects in
Denmark, Sweden, UK, and US.
Percentage of
-15 to +10 +10 to +20 +20 to +50 +50 to +100 +100 to +500
difference (%)
Percentage of 24 5 24 32 15
projects (%)
Note: Percentage of difference is calculated by (Actual-Forecast)/Actualx100
Source: Adopted from Skamris and Flyvberg, 1997
Table 25: Percentage distribution of traffic development in 20 transport infrastructure projects in
Denmark, Sweden, and US.
Percentage of
-90 to -70 -70 to -60 -60 to -50 -50 to -20 -20 to 0 0 to +30
difference (%)
Percentage of 15 20 25 25 10 5
projects (%)
Note: Percentage of difference is calculated by (Actual-Forecast)/Actualx100
Source: Adopted from Skamris and Flyvberg, 1997
Table 26: Difference between actual development and forecasts of construction costs and traffic for
metro systems in developing countries
Difference between actual development and forecasts
Construction cost Number of projects Traffic Number of projects
-10% to +10% 3 As forecast 1
+10% to +20% 1 0 to -20% 1
+20% to +50% 3 -20% to -50% 2
+50% to +100% 4 -50% to -60% 2
+100% to + 500% 2 -60% to -70% 2
Source: Adopted from Skamris and Flyvberg, 1997
13 For more detailed information about the documents, see Skamris and Flyvberg, 1997
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And according to Trujillo and others (2001), there is enough experience to be able to argue that
overoptimistic demand forecasting is common. For instance, traffic forecast for some of the most
publicized toll roads projects overshot actual traffic from 25% (Cuernavaca-Acapulco in Mexico) to
as much as 60% (M1-M15 Highway in Hungary or the average for the Mexican toll road program).
Most of Asia's BOTs projects for toll roads were based on very optimistic growth assumptions pre-
dating the fallout at the end of the 1990s (Trujillo et al, 2001, p6)
4-2-2. Characteristics of demand forecasting
Basically, demand forecasting is challenging part with a lot of complex factors to be considered
technically and economically. Engel and others point out challenging macro and micro risks in
demand forecasting as follows:
Demand forecasts are based on estimates of both macroeconomic risks, which are tied to the
aggregate performance of the economy, and microeconomic risks, which reflect local demand
fluctuations. Errors in either estimate will throw off forecasts of demand, which are usually
inaccurate in the short term (three to five years) an all but useless in the long term (Engel et al, 1997,
p 95).
And they provide practical data showing the characteristics of passenger demand in the Table 27.
The table shows the rates of growth of vehicles paying tolls during 1986-1994 when Chile was most
stable without any recessions. Macroeconomic trend is recognized in the positive growth rates all
through the period and specifically faster growth rates in 1987 on all the three roads.
Microeconomic trend is reflected in the incoherent fluctuation from one road to another in most
years. (Engel et al, 1997)
Table 27: Growth rate of vehicles paying tolls on three main toll roads in Chile
Toll Road 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Angostura 8.8 15.0 11.7 4.5 8.7 12.4 6.7 7.8 9.4
Zapata 21.5 14.4 13.1 8.1 7.2 5.2 2.9 3.9 4.9
Lampa 3.8 13.4 15.9 8.9 6.8 18.0 8.8 16.2 12.5
Source: Engel et al, 1997
And, in the context of privatization, Trujillo and others argue that forecasting of users' willingness
to pay roads in privatized projects and their behavior of pursuing an alternative such as free roads is
an important part but often is managed poorly and ignored by government and regulators. This
often can lead to significant overestimates when there is no or little experience of payment of fair
prices, the introduction of efficient pricing policies based on project costs can result in significant
trend changes and the past is a poor indicator of the future. And they provide technical
improvement about analytical instruments and the data processing capabilities enough to argue that
some forecasting firms are willing to sell their forecast with insurance in case of significant gaps
between forecasts and occurrences 4. With this regard, they emphasize that more investment is
needed on demand forecasting pointing out that both regulators and concessionaire or bidders
devote much more money to the construction costs studies than to the demand analysis-the average
ratio quoted among experts is one (Trujillo et al, 2000).
French Highway Directorate, with comprehensive study of road concession programs in Europe,
also argues that the increasing degree of interrelationship between motorway sections under
concession within the same network is making it more and more difficult for the concession
companies alone to carry the commercial risk, since traffic levels can vary considerably according
to commercial policies that are defined on an individual basis. And long concession period also
makes it difficult to bear commercial risks due to high uncertainty (French Highway Directorate,
1999)
14 For more detailed information such as technical improvement of demand forecasting in actual cases, see Trujillo et al, 2000
71
However, interestingly and reasonably, Wachs (1990), arguing that public resource allocation is
competitive process selecting some projects among a lot of projects proposed, imply that these
complexity of demand forecasting is a ground of political misuse to get the projects started rather
than a reason of demand forecasting failures and show such characteristics of demand forecasting as
follows5:
* Forecasts cannot be verified until the intended action is actually taken;
* Forecasts are technically complex: elaborate data bases and complex mathematical models are
used to make forecasts of the demand for and the cost of large public works. The technical reports
in which the forecasts are presented are weighty, written in technical jargon, and replete with
mathematical equations and tables of computer printouts. Consequently, very few people other than
those who prepare them can every fully review and critique them. In short, it is often very difficult
to prove that forecasts were adjusted for political reasons.;
* Forecasts always require subjective assumptions: the technical complexity of forecasts is in fact
quite misleading. While equations, computers, and enormous data bases give the forecasts an aura
of "science," which invests them with certain authority in the political arena, the most critical data
needed to make a forecast often consists of assumptions about the future. The complex
mathematical models and large data bases characteristic of modern forecasts thus obfuscate the fact
that they are all elaborations of relatively simple assumptions about the future, and they hide from
the public the fact that the assumptions included in the forecast can be selected to help advocate
certain courses of action for political purposes; and
* Forecasts are the product of "Many Hands," and moral responsibility is hard to fix: Because
forecasts are prepared by large organizations, such as consulting firms which are in turn employed
by government departments, and because complex computer models and data bases are managed by
"5 Wachs, 1990 pp146-152
teams, it is invariably difficult to identify one person or small group of people who can be held
responsible for critical decisions, such as the making of core assumptions, which lead to self-
serving outcomes. The larger the number of people involved, and the greater the complexity of the
forecasting procedures, the less likely it is that each participant in the process will feel morally
responsible for the consequences.
4-2-3. Strategic optimism of demand forecasting
Wachs, interviewing public officials, consultants, and planners in the U.S., concludes that the cost
overruns and patronage overestimates were not the result of technical errors, honest mistakes, or
inadequate methods. In case after case, planners, engineers, and economists have had to "revise"
their forecasts many times because they failed to satisfy their superiors. The forecasts had to be
"cooked" in order to produce numbers and get the project started with federal support, whether or
not they could be justified on technical grounds (Wachs, 1990, p 144).
Wachs also describes planners' conflicted position as "scientists" analyzing data objectively and as
"advocates" revising data- for example, documenting positive facts without negative impacts,
reconsidering assumptions to increase demand and enumerating indirect benefit enough to result in
an excess of benefits over costs- in favor of client's preferred direction. (Wachs, 1989, pp476-477)
Skamris and Flyvberg, with the statistical dada shown in the Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25, argue
that the difference between actual traffic demand and construction cost and their forecasts is
consistently biased-underestimation of costs, overestimation of demand-and hence cannot be
explained by the inherent difficulty in predicting the future. And being presented to parliament,
other decision makers and the public, these misleading forecasts is likely to lead to misallocation of
funds and poor performance of projects. (Skamris and Flyvberg, 1997)
And Flyvbjerg and others, in the same context of showing strategic optimism of public sector, even
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though focusing on underestimation of costs from 181 projects collected worldwide with four year
efforts as shown in the Table 28, conclude that in 9 out of 10 transportation infrastructure projects,
costs are underestimated. This cannot be explained by error and seems to be best explained by
strategic misrepresentation, i.e., lying. The use of deception and lying as tactics in power struggles
aimed at getting projects started and at making a profit appear to best explain why costs are highly
and systematically underestimated in transportation infrastructure projects. (Flyvbjerg et al, 2002, p
290)
Table 28: Inaccuracy of transportation project cost estimates by geographical location (fixed prices)
Project Europe North America Other geographical area
type Number Average Standard Number Average Standard Number Average Standard
of cost deviation of cost deviation of cost deviation
projects escalation projects escalation projects escalation
(N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%)
Rail 23 34.2 25.1 19 40.8 36.8 16 64.6 49.5
Fixed-link 15 43.4 52.0 18 25.7 70.5 0 - -
Road 143 22.4 24.9 24 8.4 49.4 0 - -
All projects 181 25.7 28.7 61 23.6 54.2 16 64.6 49.5
Source: Flyvbjerg et al, 2002
With this regard, Bruzelius and others (1998) suggest that one of solution to deal with strategic
misuse of demand forecasting is to involvement of private risk capital. In principle, the most
important issue from an accountability point of view is the actual decision on whether to undertake
the investment in a project or not. Government in itself is not sufficiently effective when it comes to
enforcing accountability with respect to specific issues such as decisions on major infrastructure
investments. A more effective way of achieving this is to let the decision to go ahead with a project-
given the project satisfies agreed public interest objectives-be conditioned by the willingness of
private financiers to participate in the project without a sovereign guarantee. (Bruzelius et al, 1998)
Furthermore, this strategic optimism also can be in the private sector. In many of the earlier road
concessions, concessionaires have been either overly optimistic or overly aggressive in bidding,
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leading to a host of restructuring and renegotiation. With a study on early concession programs in
Chile, Gomez-Lobo and Hinojosa (2000) argue that private firms pursue this strategy for several
reasons as follows 16:
* When several projects are going to be concessioned, firms may be interested in giving low cost or
aggressive behavior to other bidders in order to discourage some competitors from participating in
furture contests.
* When construction firms are often the key consortium partner, construction contracts rather than
the subsequent operation of the concession are the dominant interest, and bidding below cost
secures the construction contracts, with disregard to the long-term financial viability of the
concession, which will be the problem of the other consortium members or the creditors.
* Firms may bid low just to win the franchise with the expectation of future support from
government in the possible renegotiating process. The governments will find it difficult to let the
concession fail. Indeed, if the concession runs into financial problems in the future, associated
political problems occur as well as costs and delays in re-tendering the project. Therefore, bidding
low and renegotiating afterward may be a viable strategy for a potential concessionaire (a
phenomenon called "lowballing").
* Finally, one cannot rule out optimization mistakes on the part of bidders, possibly related to poor
assessment of demand uncertainty ("winner's curse"), or the complexity of tendering mechanisms.
Even though this optimism pointed out by Gomez-Lobo and Hinojosa can be eliminated in the
establishment of explicit regulatory regime in terms of risk allocation, it is important part the
regulator should remember to deal with privatization process, in that private firms' behavior could
be unreasonably strategic even assuming fatal risks otherwise retained by the government.
16 Gomez-Lobo and Hinojosa, 2000, pp9-10
4-3. Demand risk allocation comparison
As implied by Bruzelius and others (1998), the private firm's participation in concession program at
their own risks could be a solution to eliminate the possible strategic optimism in development of
large infrastructure. But, as explained in Chapter 2, not all risks are the same and therefore must not
be borne by the same entity. And care must be taken to ensure that an entity carrying a given risk
possesses the incentive to do.
If the public authority seeks to persuade concession companies to take certain risks, which they are
unable to control, this will prolong negotiations and increase the level of remuneration demanded
by the investors. If, on the other hand, the concession company seeks to disengage itself from
purely technical or principally commercial or financial risks at the expense of the government, the
utility of the concession should be re-examined. The transfer of risk from the public authority to the
concession company enhances productive efficiency (French Highway Directorate, 1999)
In practice, actual regulatory regimes for risk allocation and incentives vary significantly from one
country to another. In chapter 2, Table 1 shows an example of the diversity of risk allocation
including future demand risk (commercial risk) allocation practiced between concession companies
and concession authorities in Europe. As shown in the Table 1, the commercial risks are mainly
transferred to concession companies. In Europe, 8 countries including France, the commercial risk
is borne by the private participants in the road concession program. And 3 countries including
England under shadow toll system, the demand risk is also borne by the concession company even
though the risk is substantially supported by the public sector.
With this regard, this chapter is to compare the two mechanisms-shadow toll mechanism in the UK
and minimum guarantee mechanism in Korea-in details in terms of demand risk allocation.
4-3-1. Risk shifting of demand forecasting in UK17
Payment Mechanisms - Shadow Toll Payment Mechanism
The Highways Agency pays each DBFO Co an amount, which is based on the number and type of
vehicles using the road, with adjustments made for lane closure and safety performance. These are
known as "shadow tolls" as opposed to real tolls, as payment for usage is made by the Highways
Agency rather than by the road user. The payment is based on the following three criteria:
Usage/Demand: Shadow toll payments are made per vehicle using a kilometer of the project road,
in accordance with the tolling structure and increase over time in accordance with an indexation
formula. Different payments are due for traffic within different traffic bands and dependent on the
length of vehicle. Bidders were asked to bid the parameters of traffic levels for a maximum of four,
and a minimum of two, bands, with the proviso that the top band - anything exceeding X vehicle
kilometers p.a. - must have toll levels set at zero to ensure that the maximum liability of the Agency
under the DBFO contract is capped. Bidders set the bands and tolls from their own assessment of
traffic levels. Most bidders opted for four bands with the lowest band representing a cautious view
of traffic and tolls within that band set at a level that would cover debt service requirements (but
would not provide a return on equity). Figure 5 shows a typical banding structure proposed by
bidders.
Availability of Service: Where the project road consists of an existing stretch of road with one or
more construction schemes along its length, then shadow toll payments will be made at a reduced
level representing the cost and operation for the existing road.
Performance: Two elements-safety and lane closure-form the basis of performance payments. The
concession company is encouraged to suggest safety improvement schemes with incentives for
17 In part or in whole, this chapter is directly quoted from The Highways Agency in UK, 2003a and 2003b.
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improving safety on the Project Road. If approved, the concession company constructs and pays for
the scheme and is recompensed by receiving 25% of the economic cost of each personal injury
accident avoided in the following five year period. And a deduction is made from the toll payment
when lanes are closed. The size of the deduction is dependant upon the number of lanes closed, the
duration of the closure, the expected traffic at the time of the closure and the economic value of user
delay. Lane closures charges are only made for closures within the control of the concession
company.
Figure 5: Typical banding structure proposed by bidders
Band 4: Op
Band 3: lp
-(Base case traffic)
Band 2: 3p
Band 1: 10p
Time
Source: The Highways Agency in UK, 2003a
Traffic risk allocation
The number and type of vehicles using a road affect the cost of constructing a road with a
reasonable life expectancy, and the cost of maintaining it to the required standard. The Agency has
its own traffic projections for the project road, which are updated forecasts based on traffic models
devised for the initial investment decision for individual road schemes within the DBFO (Design-
Build-Finance-Operate) project. The updated traffic forecasts are kept confidential. The Agency
developed a probability distribution for traffic based on analysis of actual traffic against traffic
forecasts for a large number of different schemes. The Agency's updated forecasts were used during
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evaluation to calculate how much risk each bidder's payment structure would place on its revenue
stream at the Agency's 'most likely' traffic forecast.
The Agency's forecasts are kept confidential to encourage the bidders to take their own view of
traffic growth. The Agency provides the underlying data such as the existing traffic counts, to
facilitate bidders' forecasts. If the Agency had disclosed its forecasts the bidders might not have put
the same emphasis on forming their own view of traffic.
Bidders whose traffic forecasts underestimated traffic, compared with the Agency's forecasts,
attached little risk to the payment stream, resulting in poor value for money. Bidders which
overestimated traffic growth and weighted return in the higher bands, attached more risk to the
payment stream and therefore provided better value for money. A bidder's assumptions on traffic
growth may be so optimistic that, in the Agency's view, the proposed structure is financially
unstable.
The Agency carried out an analysis of the risks attaching to a project by drawing up a risk register
setting out in detail the risks relevant to each stage of the project, the likelihood of those risks
occurring and an estimate of the financial impact of occurrence. This analysis helped the Agency to
establish what type, and the quantum, of risk that they should ask the private sector to take. The
DBFO contract is drafted so that concession company bears all risks associated with an area of
delivery, such as operation, unless the Agency is specified to take a risk, either through the payment
mechanism, change mechanism, termination events or other contractual mechanisms. Therefore any
unanticipated risk will be borne by the private sector.
Advantage and disadvantages of Shadow toll mechanism
In general, shadow toll system has disadvantages as well as advantages compared with other types
of concession or budgetary projects as follows18:
* The main advantages of a conventional toll concession contract, namely optimization of the
infrastructure with the risks and interim funding carried by the concession company, are maintained
with a shadow toll system;
* there is no tendency to shift traffic onto other roads;
* no expenses associated with toll collection are incurred1 9;
* the spreading of financial charges over a period of time makes it possible to attenuate the
constraints of annual programming;
* but, a shadow toll system does not solve the funding problems, as the concession authority must
pay shadow toll remuneration to the concession company in due course. A shadow toll contracts
does not therefore generate new funding source. Such an arrangement makes it possible to shift
responsibility for the financial package onto the concession company (so that the debt is non-
public), but the final cost must be borne by the tax-payer ("delayed" budgetary funding), and not
the user. The financial and legal costs of this type of arrangement can be high, and should not be
underestimated. By comparison with budgetary funding, the shadow toll method also highlights an
apparent increase in financial expenses (due principally to the return on invested capital required)
is The World Bank, 2001
19 Approximately 10 to 15% of revenue are absorbed by toll collection costs, and about 10% of the initial cost of the infrastructure represents
construction of the toll stations.
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4-3-2 Demand risk allocation comparison (1)
In shadow toll mechanism, because government (or other public authority) pays tolls to the
concession company, the roads are free for users. In minimum guarantee mechanism, the
concession company collects tolls from the users. The total annual toll revenue can be calculated by
Vehicle km per annum multiplied by tariff. And this relationship is showed in the Figure 6
Figure 6: Comparison of user toll revenue
User Toll lT•r Tnll
Revenu Reveni
1.1 R
0.9 R
Vehicle km per Vehicle km per
A. Shadow toll mechanism B. Minimum guarantee mechanism
Source: Adopted from French Highway Directorate, 1999 & PIMA, 2002
In shadow toll mechanism, the government remunerates the concession company based on the
banding structure of the concession. Figure 7 shows annual government payment according to
vehicle km per annum. This graph, to simplify, is based on the Figure 5(Typical banding structure
proposed by bidders), without considering adjustment of safety and performance.
In minimum guarantee mechanism, it is assumed that the government guarantees 90% of the
estimated operation revenue. When the actual operation revenue exceeds 110% of the estimated
operation revenue the State redeems the excess revenue as shown in the Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Comparison of cash flow from government
Payment
Government Subsidy
(S(hadow Toll)
0.9 R
4
Vehicle km per annum
A. Shadow toll mechanism B. Minimum guarantee mechanism
Source: Adopted from French Highway Directorate, 1999 & PIMA, 2002
Then, the Figure 8 shows aggregated revenue pattern for concessionaire, which is drawn by
overlapping the Figure 6 and Figure 7. In both cases, the revenue of the concession company is
limited. In case A, total remuneration of the concession company is capped, as there is no further
payment above a certain traffic level (band 4) and in case B, toll revenue of concession company is
also capped, because the excess above 110% of estimated revenue should be redeemed by the
government.
In case A, even though passenger demand risk is transferred to the concession company as
mentioned in the 4-3-1, the initial steeper slope of total revenue corresponding to lower vehicle km
per annum could be recognized as a government support in case of lower passenger demand in the
typical banding structure of shadow toll system; the slope decreases with increasing actual
passenger demand. But, in case of B, risk of lower passenger demand is totally retained by the
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government with the steady slope below 90% of estimated passenger demand, which reduce private
firm's incentive to screen the concession project; especially the passenger demand risk.
Figure 8: Comparison of total revenue
Total
RevenueA
1.1 R
0.9 R
Band Band 2 : Band3 Ban d4
Vehicle km per annum
Vehicle km per annum
----------------------- -
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A. Shadow toll mechanism B. Minimum guarantee mechanism
Source: Adopted from French Highway Directorate, 1999 & PIMA, 2002
4-3-3 Demand risk allocation comparison (2)
Endogenous demand forecasting in shadow toll mechanism in UK
As explained in 3-3-1, in the UK, the concession company made its own demand forecasts based
mainly on the information released from the concession authority. Then, based on the result, the
concession company proposes a banding structure for tariff to recover its investment. In this process,
the demand forecasts of potential bidders could be implemented in various ways with probably
different emphases and perspectives at the risk of its future cash inflow.
However, when it comes to demand forecasting, shadow toll system is different from other tolling
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systems because, in shadow toll system, the roads are free for users and hence there is no tendency
to shift traffic onto other alternatives to avoid toll cost as mentioned in 4-3-1. One of the complex
problems to consider in demand forecasts in context of privatization, which is mentioned in 4-2-2,
is solved automatically. This is one of the unique characteristic-one of the advantages-of shadow
toll mechanism the regulator should understand in reviewing shadow toll system, designing traffic
demand risk allocation and its compensation.
Exogenous demand forecasting in minimum guarantee mechanism in Korea
As mentioned in 3-2-3, in Korea, the preliminary feasibility study and detailed feasibility study of a
given large infrastructure projects are prepared by public research institutes such as Korea
Development Institute (KDI), Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS), Korea
Transport Institute (KOTI), and etc. In other words, the demand forecasting is done by exogenous
entities rather than by concessionaire.
Then, the potential bidders are required to screen and justify the demand forecasts of a given
projects to mainly decide whether to participate in the project or not. In this process, government's
guarantee of up to 90% of expected revenue (tariff x demand) significantly reduces incentive of
private firms to screen the demand forecasts due to certain confidence of future revenue to the
degree of government guarantee allowed. The success of the project depends primarily on accuracy
of demand forecasts from the public institutes. But, as discussed earlier, one cannot rule totally out
the strategic optimism of demand forecasts in the public and private sector, and cannot expect
private sector's desperate efforts to screen the feasibility at the risk of recovery of private fund
investment under significantly reduced incentive in this regime (PIMA 2002).
Theoretically, even minimum revenue mechanism could be efficient to attract private fund even in
certain countries, provided that the accurate demand forecast could be guaranteed by other
exogenous efforts rather than endogenous risk allocation in concession program. Nevertheless,
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minimum guarantee mechanism (up to 90% of expected revenue) in the rate of return regulation
regime has difficulty to deal with the problems discussed in this chapter, through risk allocation in
concession program endogenously.
In this context, Engel and others argue that government guarantees for private infrastructure
projects reduce the incentive of firms to perform efficiently, weaken the incentive to screen projects
for white elephants, and shift government obligations to future periods. Thus the use of guarantees
needs to be limited, and they need to be carefully designed (Engel et al, 1997, p 89). And they
provide San Jose Logoon Toll Bridge in Puerto Rico as an example as follows:
The San Jose Logoon Toll Bridge was built to relieve congestion in the San Juan region in Puerto
Rico. The guaranteeing to buy bask the project at the concessionaire's request if traffic fell short of
80 percent of projections during the first three years and 100 percent of projections after nine years.
In the event of a buy back, the government would reimburse the concessionaire for all project costs
and pay it a 13 percent return on its investment. Under this badly designed guarantee scheme the
concessionaire has few incentives to screen the quality of the project. (Engel et al, 1997, P93)
4-4. Strategic Implication
Theoretically, the minimum guarantee mechanism can be improved in some ways. The first option
is to reshape the total revenue curve similar to that of shadow toll mechanism. This can be achieved
from making the government guarantee increase gradually from the lower point (for example, 30%)
than 90% of expected revenue to the 90% of expected revenue as shown in the Figure 9. In the
Figure 9, solid line shows total revenue of a concessionaire; triangle C is toll revenue, and triangle
B is cash flow from government guarantee. And triangle C is reduced government guarantee
compared to the current mechanism in Korea in the Figure 8. This reduced government guarantee
increases incentive for a concessionaire to screen the project feasibility at the risk of its investment,
and also decreases the budgetary burden of the government. This strategic option can be done in
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many ways, if one makes the total revenue curve similar to that of shadow toll mechanism and the
Figure 9 shows a simple example of them.
Figure 9: Suggested Example of Government Revenue Guarantee
Total
Revenue
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0.9 R
0.3R
Vehicle km per annum
The second option is to improve the accuracy of demand forecasts done by public institutes. As
mentioned in Chapter 3, MPB now is considering other private institute and private firms as well as
PIMA for the needed expertise and higher objectiveness for the feasibility studies of large
infrastructure projects. But, as discussed in the thesis, more effective way to deal with biased failure
of demand forecasts in large infrastructure projects is to involve private participation at the risk of
private investment in the project development. This option is exogenous method and is not as
powerful and reachable as endogenous way such as the first option.
4-5. Summary
Frequent failures of demand forecasting in large transportation infrastructure projects are fairly
biased toward overestimation. This cannot be explained by error and appears to be best explained
by strategic misrepresentation of public sector. Under competitive process of public fund allocation
selecting some projects among a lot of projects proposed, the use of strategic optimism as tactics in
power struggles for getting a project started seems to best explain why demand forecasting are
systematically overestimated.
When the forecast is poorly estimated, it can lead to a considerable misuse of resources otherwise
can support other feasible projects. And one of solution to deal with strategic misuse of demand
forecasting is to involvement of private risk capital. Letting the decision to go ahead with a project
given, through privatization, be made by the private participants at the risk of their investment is
one of the solutions to deal with the strategic optimism of public sector.
Indeed, actual regulatory regimes for demand risk allocation and incentives vary significantly from
one country to another. Among them, shadow toll mechanism in the UK transfers demand risks to
private participants and gives higher incentive to them. Then, the concession company make its
own demand forecast endogenously at the risk of its investment. The minimum guarantee
mechanism in Korea makes traffic risks be retained by the government and gives lower incentive to
private participants. In Korea, the preliminary feasibility studies and detailed feasibility studies are
done by exogenous entities such as public institutes rather than by a concessionaire.
The discussion doesn't mean that the shadow toll mechanism is superior to minimum revenue
guarantee mechanism. Both systems have their own advantages and disadvantages and selection
and implementation of the regulatory regime could be based on unique situation of a country.
Nevertheless, in Korea, the success of the project depends primarily on accuracy of demand
forecasts from the public institutes and government's guarantee of up to 90% of expected revenue
significantly reduces incentive of private firms to screen the demand forecasts due to certain
confidence of future revenue to the degree of government guarantee allowed.
So, theoretically, the current minimum guarantee mechanism in Korea can be improved in two ways.
The first is to reshape the total revenue curve similar to that of shadow toll mechanism. This leads
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to increase incentive for a concessionaire to screen the project feasibility at the risk of its
investment, and also decrease the budgetary burden for the revenue guarantee. The second is to
improve the accuracy of demand forecasts done by public institutes, making competitive
environment with introducing other private institute and private firms in the market. This option is
exogenous method and is not as powerful and reachable as endogenous way such as the first option
Chapter 5. Conclusions
In many countries, transportation infrastructures and services have been managed by the public
sector with budgetary fund. But, the public management has resulted in inefficiency, lack of
creativity, extraordinary lifecycle costs. In addition, increasing demand of budget toward other
sector such as social welfares, make it more difficult to finance the transportation infrastructure
with budgetary funding. These problems have encouraged increasing private involvement in the
sector to achieve creativity and efficiency from private entities. However, the worldwide experience
has demonstrated that the government needs to assume new responsibilities such as creating
competitive environment for the market under monopoly issue, allocating various risks fairly
between the parties, selecting regulatory regime to control price and quality and to guarantee
reasonable profit to a concessionaire, managing government support and organizing concession
contract properly. Among them, the thesis focuses on the government's role to regulate demand risk
allocation in large transportation projects.
In Korea, since 1994, policy decisions have been taken to introduce private capital in infrastructure
with a concession scheme to alleviate its budgetary restriction of the government and allow more
public resources to be devoted to other social spending as well as to achieve creativity and
efficiency from private sector. Since then, the 128 projects with total cost of 40.6 trillion Won have
been announced as PPI projects and the actual private fund investment has increased to occupy
9.6 % of total infrastructure investment in 2002. And the government also made the list of future
PPI projects as a reference to manage the future PPI projects, which consist of 179 projects with
total cost estimate of 63 trillion Won.
On one hand, such quantitative expansion of private fund investment has been appraised in terms of
attenuating budgetary limitation and following allowance of investment in other social sectors, and
on the other hand, qualitative results of PPI projects have been on debate due mainly to optimistic
demand forecasts in hindsight and generous revenue guarantee as a reason.
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In this regard, the government should understand strategic optimism of public sector about demand
forecasts. Frequent failures of demand forecasting in large transportation infrastructure projects are
fairly biased toward overestimation. This cannot be explained by mistakes and appears to be best
explained by strategic misrepresentation of public sector. Under competitive process of public fund
allocation selecting some projects among a lot of projects proposed, the use of strategic optimism as
tactics in power struggles for getting a project started seems to best explain why demand
forecasting are systematically overestimated. And when the forecast is poorly estimated, it can lead
to a considerable misuse of resources otherwise can support other feasible projects.
One of solution to deal with strategic misuse of demand forecasting is involvement of private risk
capital. Letting the decision to go ahead with a project given, through privatization, be made by the
private participants at the risk of their investment is one of the solutions to deal with the strategic
optimism of public sector.
Indeed, actual regulatory regimes for demand risk allocation and incentives vary significantly from
one country to another. Among them, shadow toll mechanism in the UK transfers demand risks to
private participants and gives higher incentive to them. Then, the concession company make its
own demand forecast endogenously at the risk of its investment. The minimum guarantee
mechanism in Korea makes traffic risks be retained by the government and gives lower incentive to
private participants. In Korea, the preliminary feasibility studies and detailed feasibility studies are
done by exogenous entities such as public institutes rather than by a concessionaire.
The discussion doesn't mean that the shadow toll mechanism is superior to minimum revenue
guarantee mechanism. Both systems have their own advantages and disadvantages and selection
and implementation of the regulatory regime could be based on unique situation of a country.
Nevertheless, in Korea, the success of the project depends primarily on accuracy of demand
forecasts from the public institutes and government's guarantee of up to 90% of expected revenue
significantly reduces incentive of private firms to screen the demand forecasts due to certain
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confidence of future revenue to the degree of government guarantee allowed.
So, theoretically, the current minimum guarantee mechanism in Korea can be improved in two ways.
The first is to reshape the total revenue curve similar to that of shadow toll mechanism. This leads
to increase incentive for a concessionaire to screen the project feasibility at the risk of its
investment, and also decrease the budgetary burden for the revenue guarantee. The second is to
improve the accuracy of demand forecasts done by public institutes, making competitive
environment with introducing other private institute and private firms in the market. This option is
exogenous method and is not as powerful and reachable as endogenous way such as the first option
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Annex 1. Table of example 1 of risk allocation (Source: Estache and Strong, 2000)
Risk Contractor Operator Equity Lenders Government Insurance Unallocated
Construction Phase
1. Cost overruns/delays due to
Design *
Engineering *
Construction *
2. Change in legal requirements
Federal *
State *
Local *
3. Land acquisition *
4. Weather *
5. Natural disasters
Insurable *
Uninsurable *
6. Industrial action
Site specific *
General *
7. Environmental
EIS breach *
Known or caused by state *
Other-major *
Other-minor *
8. Civil disobedience
Facility-related *
Other *
9. Traffic and activity relocation *
10. Insurance
Fire *
Workers compensation *
Public liability *
11. Force majeure
12. Confiscation
State *
Federal * *
13. Approvals/licenses/permits *
14. Variations
By government *
By contractor *
15. Interest rate risk * *
16. Taxation * * * *
17. Other tariffs and charges * * *
Operation Phase
1. Revenue/Traffic/Demand * * *
2. Operation *
3. Maintenance *
4. Defects liability *
5. Natural disaster
Insurable
Uninsurable
6. Industrial action
Site specific * *
General * *
7. Environmental
Known or caused by state *
Other-major * *
Other-minor *
8. Civil disobedience
Facility-related *
Other *
9. Insurance
Fire *
Workers compensation *
Public liability *
10. Force majeure *
11. Confiscation
State *
Federal *
12. Interest rate risk * *
13. Taxation * * *
14. Other tariffs and charges * *
Annex 2. Table of example 2 of risk allocation (Source: PICKO, 2001)
Risk Allocation under PPI
Public Shared Private
sector sector
1. Demand and revenue risks
- Passenger demand O
- Fare levels O
- Development of Service Patterns O
2. Operation risks (including maintenance)
- Cost of operations O
- New regulation O
- Fire O
- Theft O
- Accidental damage O
- Vandalism (not covered by insurance) O
- Health and safety costs O
- Breach of environmental regulations O
- Training costs O
- Exchange rates O
- Defects that require repair to maintain performance O
- Integration of new assets into the system O
- Replacement of major items of equipment O
3. Design and construction cost
- Site availability
- Commissioning and systems integration
- Site costs
- Inadequate design
- Design errors
- Late design changes
- Design delays
- Site access problems
- Unforeseen ground conditions
- Environment
- Archaeological discoveries
- Weather O
- Strikes O
- Interference from third parties O
- Interactions with utilities and statutory undertakers O
- Noise restrictions O
- Buildability O
- Delays with procurement of materials O
- Availability of plant O
- Unproven technology O
- System integration O
- Delays with approvals O
- Insolvency of subcontractors or suppliers O
- Commissioning difficulties O
- Contractual claims O
-Abandonment of contract O
- Construction defects O
- Third-party liability O
- Fire O
- Flood O
- Health and safety O
4. Financial and economic risks
- Inflation O
- Interest rate O
- Exchange rate O
-Availability of private finance O
5. Other risks
- Taxation O
- Change in legislation O
Annex 3. Article about government subsidy in the Act on PPI(Source: MPB, 2003)
ACT ON PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE
Article 53 (Financial Support) If it is necessary for the efficient implementation of construction
projects of revertible facilities, the Central or local government may grant a subsidy or long-term
loan to the concessionaire, only where prescribed by the Presidential Decree.
ENFORCEMENT DECREE OF THE ACT ON PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN
INFRASTRUCTURE
Article 37 (Financial Support)
(1) The State or local governments may grant any subsidy or long-term loan to the concessionaire
within the scope of the budget after deliberation of the Committee, in the following cases under the
provisions of Article 53 of the Act:
1. Where dissolution of the corporation is inevitable;
2. Where it is an inevitable measure to maintain the user fee at an appropriate level;
3. Where inducement of private capital is difficult due to a fall in the profitability of the project as a
result of a considerable expenditure disbursed as compensation for the use of land;
4. Where the actual operational profit (referring to the amount obtained by multiplying the user fee
by the demand for the concerned facility) falls considerably short of the estimated operational profit
under the concession agreement, to such an extent that the operation of the facility is difficult;
5. Where it is difficult to actively conduct the private investment project without a long-term loan or
subsidy prior to conducting projects which are low in profitability but which can considerably
reduce the construction period or the cost of construction of other projects when conducted together
with other private investment projects; and
6. Where the losses from exchange rate fluctuations occur, due to the excessive exchange rate
fluctuation, in the borrowings in foreign currency for the construction funds which are raised by the
project executor through outside capital.
(2) In granting a subsidy under the provisions of paragraph (1) 5, the State or a local government
shall calculate the amount required for the implementation of the project concerned by applying the
method of anticipating the price and the method of adjusting the contract amount under the
provisions of Chapters 2 and 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Contracts to Which the
State is a Party, or Chapter 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Finance Act, and shall grant
this within the limit of the amount calculated.
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Annex 4. Determination of Rate of Return and Tariff (Source: MPB, 2000)
1. The rate of return and tariff of the private investment project shall be determined in accordance
with the following formula:
C cc, NOR -OCi N ANR,
=0 (1 + r) i=n+l (1+ r)' i= (1 + r)'
n : time of completion of construction
N : time of expiration of concession period or period of ownership and operation (for the
facilities subject to the permanent ownership of the private sector, this refers to assessment period)
CCi : annual input of the project cost required for the completion of construction of
facilities--Government financial support shall be excluded herefrom.
ORi : annual operation revenue (annual operation cash inflow)
OCi : annual operation cost (annual operation cash outflow)
ANRi : annual net revenue cash inflow from supplementary project(s)
(income - expenditure)
r : real rate of return of the project
The competent authority indicates in the instruction for proposal the base time for calculating the
total project cost (CCi), operation revenue (ORi), operation cost (OCi), net revenue from
supplementary project(s) (ANRi), etc., in constant price. Such base time may be re-determined at
the conclusion of the concession agreement.
The competent authority indicates the construction period (n) and concession period or period of
use and profit-making (N-n) in the instruction for proposal. The period of use for government
reverted facilities may not exceed fifty (50) years.
2. Determination of the rate of return(r) for agreement
The proposer shall autonomously suggest the rate of return for agreement on the basis of the
expected rate of return considering factors such as investment cost, operation revenue, finance
procurement costs, etc. The proposer and the competent authority shall agree upon the rate of
return through negotiations.
The following items may be taken into account in determining the rate of return for agreement:
*The average level of interest rate for borrowing from both domestic and international
financial organizations with respect to infrastructure facilities
eThe risk premium after taking into account the risks that can be expected from the project
characteristics and its implementation such as the type, scale, security of operation revenue, revenue
from supplementary facilities, the level of risk allocated to the Government, etc.
eLevel of rate of return for similar private investment project cases domestically and
internationally
The competent authority may consult with PICKO for its support when calculating and negotiating
for the rate of return.
Ex post adjustment of the rate of return (r) agreed upon in the concession agreement is not
permitted during project implementation.
3. Calculation of total project cost, etc.
3-1 Calculation of the total project cost (Z CCi)
The total project cost refers to the costs for the establishment, expansion, and reformation of
infrastructure facilities. The calculation consists of the following:
*Survey cost: Cost for the survey of the implementation of the project (based on the pricing
standards for engineering projects under Article 10 of the Engineering Technology Promotion Act);
*Design cost: Cost for the design activities of the project (based on the pricing standards for
engineering projects under Article 10 of the Engineering Technology Promotion Act or the
rewarding standards for certified architects under Article 26 of the Certified Architect Act);
*Construction cost: Sum of material cost, labor cost, general expenses, management cost and
profits for the implementation of the project [based on the estimation and pricing standards and unit
price under Article 9 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Contract to which the State is a party
(this refers to the price announced by the government, if any)];
*Compensation cost: Cost for purchase of lands (including cost for purchase of buildings and
trees), resettlement of local residents, and compensation for trading, fishing and mining rights for
the implementation of the project;
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*Incidental cost: All costs including cost for feasibility study, environmental impact
assessment, and supervision, and financial costs incidental to raising financial resources.
(Applicable only towards incidental financial costs where specific financing plan has been
concluded in agreement)
*Equipment operation cost: Cost for materials and equipment invested for the first time for
operation of facilities;
*Taxes and public utility rates: Taxes including acquisition tax, registration tax, and VAT on
the implementation, completion, registration of the project and transfer of ownership, and others
levied by the Acts; and
*Reserves for operation: Necessary expenses for operation of facilities such as cost for
establishing a corporation and cost of starting a project.
Total project cost set forth in the concession agreement shall not be adjusted, except in the
following events:
owhere it is deemed necessary to adjust the total project cost according to price level, due to
significant price fluctuations during the construction period;
*where it is practically impossible to determine the construction cost, etc., in the concession
agreement (In such a case, the concession agreement shall indicate the timing, procedure and
method of determining the total project cost.); or
oother force majeure where there occurs an inevitable circumstance(s) to adjust the total
project cost, as determined by the concession agreement.
3-2 Calculation of operation cost (Z OCi)
Aggregate sum of the cost required for the operation of the facilities, including, but not limited to,
the cost of repair and reformation, corporate tax, etc., incurred during the operation period after
completion of construction.
Financial cost and depreciation (including redemption cost for the incorporation cost, initial
operation cost, goodwill, etc.) shall not be included in the calculation of operation cost as separate
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items since financial cost is reflected in the real rate of return and depreciation is compensated by
the recovery of total project cost during concession period.
3-3. Calculation of net revenue from supplementary project (E ANRi)
Net revenue from the supplementary project(s) excluding the costs, includes all revenue and cost
from the implementation of the supplementary project(s) up to the time such revenue occurs.
4. Filing and Adjustment of Initial Tariff and Annual Tariff
The concessionaire shall determine and report the initial tariff for the first year of operation to the
competent government pursuant to tariff adjustment method set forth in the concession agreement,
e.g., the reflection of the consumer price fluctuation rate during construction period.
The concessionaire shall determine and report the annual tariff subsequent to initial year of
operation to the competent government pursuant to tariff adjustment method set forth in the
concession agreement, e.g., the reflection of the consumer price fluctuation rate of the previous year.
In accordance with the method stipulated in the concession agreement, the concessionaire shall
report the figure for the tariff to the competent authority no later than sixty (60) days prior to the
collection of tariff, along with the documents indicating the following:
*method of use and the rate of tariff:
obasic documents of calculation;
*collection method;
othe rate of reduction, exemption or extra charges of tariff as well as the parties to which they
shall apply;
othe level of tariff for similar facilities; and
oother necessary matters with regard to tariff.
In the event that the method of use and tariff of the facilities determined by the concessionaire are
considered significantly detrimental to the convenience of the user(s), the competent authority may
adjust the said method of use, tariff and other matters necessary for the management and operation
of the facilities, upon consultation with the concessionaire.
